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INTRODUCTION
Residual, de facto segregation is among the most enduring barriers to equal op-
portunity in America.1 Nearly five decades after the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 
Blacks and Latinos still tend to live in neighborhoods where the majority of residents 
are people of color.2 Such racial segregation is often accompanied by economic seg-
regation. One legal scholar has noted that “[e]xposure to extensive poverty is the 
norm for most blacks and Latinos, while the opposite is true for most whites and 
Asians.”3 Meanwhile, sociologists, housing law scholars, and poverty law experts 
have stressed the importance of residential location to the impact of poverty and the 
                                                                                                                
1. PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF 
PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY (2013); Sheryll Cashin, Place, Not Race: Affirmative 
Action and the Geography of Educational Opportunity, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 935, 935 
(2014) (“I reflect on how residual, de facto segregation and the stratified architecture of op-
portunity in our nation contribute to the achievement gap that has made race-based affirmative 
action necessary.”). 
2. Cashin, supra note 1, at 939. 
3. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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potential for upward economic mobility.4 Residential location may have “an effect 
over and above the effect of poverty alone on upward mobility, unemployment, and 
social problems, among other outcomes.”5  
Ben Carson, the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD), indicated during confirmation hearings in January 2017 that, while he does 
not believe the federal government should play a significant role in affirmative ef-
forts to promote integration in housing, he supports such efforts by local HUD offi-
cials and state housing authorities.6 In other words, Carson has advocated for limited 
                                                                                                                
4. See, e.g., SHARKEY, supra note 1, at 5 (“When researchers analyze economic inequal-
ity or economic mobility across racial or ethnic groups, they often focus on characteristics of 
individuals and families within these groups, things like human capital, family structure, or 
culture . . . . This research offers valuable insights into the sources of inequality—but it often 
overlooks or minimizes the role of forces that lie outside the individual, or outside the home 
environment, that influence the fortunes of different racial and ethnic groups . . . . I focus on 
the importance of places—communities and cities—as crucial sites for the transmission of 
racial inequality in the post civil rights era.”); Cashin, supra note 1, at 935–66; Douglas S. 
Massey & Mary J. Fischer, The Geography of Inequality in the United States, 1950–2000,
2003 BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URB. AFF. 1, 1 (“If income inequality rises during a 
period in which rich and poor families become more segregated, only one outcome is possible: 
affluence and poverty both will become more geographically concentrated. Families that are 
well-off financially will increasingly live near and interact with other affluent families, and 
those that lack economic resources will live near and interact mainly with other poor families. 
Under these circumstances, the social worlds of the rich and poor will increasingly diverge. 
The poor will tend to inhabit high-risk neighborhoods that significantly lower the odds of so-
cioeconomic success, while the affluent will enjoy a safe and secure world that enhances the 
possibilities of success on a variety of fronts.” (footnotes omitted)).
5. Tali Cassidy, Gabrielle Inglis, Charles Wiysonge & Richard Matzopoulos, A
Systematic Review of the Effects of Poverty Deconcentration and Urban Upgrading on Youth 
Violence, 26 HEALTH & PLACE 78, 78 (2014); Lan Deng, Comparing the Effects of Housing 
Vouchers and Low-Income Housing Tax Credits on Neighborhood Integration and School 
Quality, 27 J. PLAN. EDUC. RES. 20, 20 (2007) (“Over the past several decades, scholars have 
come to understand that neighborhood quality contributes not only to quality of life but also 
to residents’ social and economic opportunities.”).
6. Housing and Urban Development Confirmation Hearing Before the S. Banking, Hous. 
& Urban Affairs Comm., 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Ben Carson Sr., M.D.), https:// 
www.c-span.org/video/?421258-1/hud-secretary-nominee-ben-carson-testifies-confirmation-
hearing&live [https://perma.cc/XB7N-4BZV] (“What I would encourage, I don’t have any 
problem whatsoever with affirmative-action or integration. Have no no problem with that at 
all. But, I’d do have a problem with people all dictating it when they don’t know anything 
about what’s going on in the area. We have local HUD officials and where people who can 
assess what the problems are in their area and working with local officials can come up with 
better solutions than a one size fits all cookie-cutter program from people in Washington, D.C. 
That’s the part. I’m sorry with five minutes your objection is not to affirmative further. The 
objection objection as to whether that’s done with Washington or the HUD office in Clovis, 
Ohio. It is central dictation to people’s lives.” (mistakes in original)). HUD implemented a 
final rule in July 2015 to lend teeth to its duty to affirmatively further fair housing (the “AFFH 
Rule”), which has existed since the enactment of the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Affirmatively 
Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272 (July 16, 2015) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 
5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576 & 903); Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 808, 42 U.S.C. § 3608 (2012). 
The final rule requires state and local governments to use a new assessment tool, expands 
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federal interference with the efforts of state and local housing authorities, whether 
by requiring them to affirmatively further integration policies or by restraining their 
efforts to do so. But an unlikely source of federal housing law—the tax code—may, 
in fact, interfere with such efforts.7 Not only are tax credits the primary federal sub-
sidy for new construction of affordable rental housing projects,8 but prior to the Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (the “TCJA”) the tax code also delivered approximately 
$129.8 billion in annual tax-based subsidies to homeowners.9 Changes under the 
TCJA scaled back or eliminated some benefits to homeowners, but current law is still 
expected to deliver approximately $75.1 billion in annual tax-based subsidies.10
                                                                                                                
access to data related to key fair housing issues, and institutes new procedural requirements. 
80 Fed. Reg. at 42,272. Soon after the rule was finalized, Ben Carson authored an op-ed criti-
cizing the rule as an example of “social engineering.” Ben S. Carson, op-ed, Experimenting 
with Failed Socialism Again, WASH. TIMES (July 23, 2015), https://www.washingtontimes 
.com/news/2015/jul/23/ben-carson-obamas-housing-rules-try-to-accomplish [https://perma 
.cc/RK63-HD4R]. At the time of writing, a bill to nullify the AFFH Rule had been introduced 
and referred to the House Committee on Financial Services. Local Zoning Decisions 
Protection Act of 2017, H.R. 482, 115th Cong. (2017). 
7. The Reagan administration effectively ended all nontax federal programs in support 
of low-income rental housing in the 1980s by slashing the budget for the Section 8 tenant-
voucher program and cutting funding for new public housing projects, replacing them with tax 
laws that shifted the responsibility for providing affordable housing from HUD to the Internal 
Revenue Service. See infra note 21. 
8. I.R.C. § 42 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-140) provides a credit to housing de-
velopers that agree to set aside a certain number of units as rent-controlled affordable housing 
for qualified tenants. The credit is available for the first ten years of a fifteen-year compliance 
period. I.R.C. § 42(f)(1) (defining the credit period), (i)(1) (defining the compliance period). 
Each state is allocated a per capita number of credits to be allocated by state and local housing 
authorities through a competitive process in accordance with state qualified allocation plans. 
I.R.C. § 42(h)(3)(C) (state housing credit ceiling), (m)(1)(B) (qualified allocation plan). 
Credits are available for new construction and rehabilitation of existing affordable rental prop-
erties. I.R.C. § 42(d). Developers who receive the credits usually sell them to investors in order 
to monetize the credits for the purposes of financing their projects. See Michael J. Novogradac, 
Investing in Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, COMMUNITY DEV. (March 2010), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170124231503/https://www.occ.gov/static/community-affairs 
/community-developments-investments/spring06/investinginlowincome.htm [https://perma 
.cc/T9WP-ZBPT]. The total size of the credit generally equals the present value of either 70% 
of constructions costs or 30% of rehabilitation costs. I.R.C. § 42(b). However, developers earn 
a 30% larger credit when they locate projects in qualified census tracts (census tracts in which 
50% or more of the households have an income below 60% of the area median gross income 
(AMGI) or where the poverty rate is at least 25%) or difficult development areas (high-cost, 
low-rent areas designated by HUD). I.R.C. § 42(d)(5)(B).
9.  JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-3-17, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES 
FOR FISCAL YEARS 2016-2020 (2017) (total reflects estimated cost of mortgage interest deduc-
tion ($63.6 billion), the deduction for qualified mortgage insurance premiums ($0.8 billion), 
the property tax deduction ($33.3 billion), and the exclusion of capital gains on sales of prin-
cipal residences ($32.1 billion) for tax year 2017). Note that this estimate does not include the 
exclusion of imputed rental income, which delivers a substantial economic benefit to home-
owners but is not reported in the JCT tax expenditure estimates. Id. at 5. 
10.  JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-34-18, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES 
FOR FISCAL YEARS 2017-2021 (2018) (total reflects estimated cost of mortgage interest 
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Yet, little is known about how these tax-based housing subsidies may work to-
gether to undermine, rather than further, efforts to promote fair housing.11 As this 
Article will show, the federal tax law discourages integration through the low-income 
housing tax credit program and rewards White-flight and economic segregation 
through the mortgage interest deduction. As a result, the tax law may exacerbate the 
enduring effects of past policies like redlining and exclusionary zoning, while also 
limiting the effectiveness of nontax federal programs intended to promote housing 
choice, such as the Section 8 tenant voucher program.  
This Article has three major objectives. The first is descriptive—one cannot 
meaningfully analyze the relationship between tax-based housing subsidies and place 
of residence without first understanding where the subsidies are going. For this rea-
son, I will begin by describing the spatial distribution of two major tax-based housing 
subsidies, the mortgage interest deduction and the low-income housing tax credit 
(LIHTC). In addition to reviewing what is known about the national distribution of 
these tax benefits, I have used publicly available data from the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) and HUD to map the flow of mortgage interest deduction and LIHTC 
benefits in Philadelphia. For reasons explained more fully below, Philadelphia is 
taken by myself and others to be representative of the Northeast, a region that stands 
to be most harmed by these tax laws due to the large amount of benefits that flow to 
the area and its continued struggle with urban segregation patterns.  
The second objective is to explain how the mortgage interest deduction creates 
incentives to move to higher quality of life areas that tend to be less economically 
and racially diverse and how both tax laws tend to limit housing location choice for 
lower income populations. While it seems unlikely that these tax laws could cause 
residential segregation in a city with no preexisting segregation patterns, in cities that 
do struggle with residential segregation, tax-based housing subsidies may reinforce 
traditional segregation patterns, exacerbate harms caused by past and current nontax 
policies, and present barriers to integration. These effects are likely to be especially 
pronounced in regions like the Northeast that not only have preexisting segregation 
patterns but also receive a disproportionate amount of benefit from the mortgage in-
terest deduction and struggle with LIHTC project clustering. 
The third objective is to evaluate what these findings tell us about the course of 
tax-based housing policy. If tax-based housing subsidies currently reward segrega-
tion, as I will suggest, then they could also be reformed to do the opposite. The ques-
tion of whether to use tax-based housing subsidies to affirmatively promote eco-
nomic and racial integration is fundamentally normative, and my proposals will 
undoubtedly invite criticism from those who reject my view of what justice requires. 
Nevertheless, this Article will make a case for changing the spatial distribution of 
benefits to affirmatively promote integrated communities and will consider several 
reform options consistent with this approach. 
                                                                                                                
deduction ($40.7 billion) and the exclusion of capital gains on sales of principal residences 
($34.4 billion) for tax year 2018). 
11. HUD expressly declined to mandate in its AFFH regulation coordination with 
Treasury. Department of Housing and Urban Development: Affirmatively Furthering Fair 
Housing, Public Comment and Response, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,298 (July 16, 2015). The IRS, like 
all federal agencies, is subject to the duty to affirmatively further fair housing; however, no 
policy specifically requires the IRS or state housing agencies to promote integration.  
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I will introduce the mortgage interest de-
duction and the LIHTC and review empirical studies about their spatial distribution 
nationwide. Part II will present maps showing the flow of subsidies in Philadelphia 
to illustrate how these tax benefits may flow to cities, and it will describe the neigh-
borhoods that receive (and do not receive) these benefits. Part III uses thought ex-
periments to demonstrate that the current distribution may not be an entirely passive 
result—tax-based housing subsidies have the potential to reinforce and exacerbate 
racial and economic segregation patterns by rewarding White-flight and limiting 
housing choices for low- and middle-income people. Part IV will argue that the ben-
efits of the current spatial distribution of tax-based housing subsidies are too uncer-
tain to outweigh the potential harm of reinforcing and exacerbating economic and 
racial segregation. Part V will recommend that the mortgage interest deduction be 
repealed and replaced with a credit and that states implement changes to their LIHTC 
allocation procedures to promote integrated communities. The Article will conclude 
with some closing thoughts and suggestions for further research. 
I. THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF TAX-BASED HOUSING SUBSIDIES 
A. Why the Spatial Distribution of Tax-Based Housing Subsidies Matters 
Thirty years have passed since the LIHTC and the mortgage interest deduction 
emerged from the Tax Reform Act of 1986, marking a decisive shift to tax-based 
subsidies for affordable housing development and a renewed commitment to tax-
subsidized home purchases.12 By characterizing these tax provisions as tax-based 
housing subsidies, this Article accepts the premise of tax expenditure theory that such 
benefits are economically equivalent to, and could alternatively be administered as, 
direct expenditures.13 Over the past three decades, these sizeable housing subsidies 
                                                                                                                
12. See, e.g., Sagit Leviner, Affordable Housing and the Role of the Low Income Housing 
Tax Credit Program: A Contemporary Assessment, 57 TAX LAW. 869, 869 (2003); Dennis J. 
Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A History and Critique of the Tax Subsidy for Mortgage 
Interest, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 236 (2010). 
13. See generally Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal “Tax Subsidies” in the National 
Budget, 22 NAT’L TAX J. 244 (1969) (arguing that the category of tax expenditures is vague, 
potentially encompasses far more provisions than tax expenditure theorists acknowledge, and 
would require a consensus as to what constitutes the comprehensive tax base); Mary L. Heen, 
Reinventing Tax Expenditure Reform: Improving Program Oversight Under the Government 
Performance and Results Act, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 751, 778–91 (2000) (providing an 
account of the history of tax expenditures and challenges to the theory); Victor Thuronyi, Tax 
Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155, 1156 (proposing an alternative approach 
to identifying tax expenditures based on substitution of tax provisions for programs that could 
be similarly accomplished through nontax laws). Tax expenditure theory was introduced by 
Stanley Surrey in the early 1970s to explain “special provisions of the federal income tax 
system which represent government expenditures made through that system to achieve various 
social and economic objectives.” Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for 
Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 
HARV. L. REV. 705, 706 (1970). Surrey hoped that, by demonstrating the economic equiva-
lence of certain credits, deductions, exemptions, and exclusions to direct expenditures, he 
could convince policymakers to repeal tax expenditures and replace them with more effective 
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have flowed through the tax system, prompting significant commentary and analysis 
about their efficiency, incidence, and distributive effects.14 Existing research gener-
ally studies the mortgage interest deduction or LIHTC as unrelated tax laws, but there 
is an important area of overlap that has not been fully explored in the literature: the 
interaction of their effects on place of residence.  
Although the mortgage interest deduction is widely understood as a housing sub-
sidy, it is not often discussed in terms of place of residence.15 One possible reason is 
that the deduction is at least superficially place-neutral. Prior to the TCJA, the 
Internal Revenue Code § 163(h) allowed a deduction for the value of interest paid on 
the first $1 million of a household’s acquisition mortgage debt (on a first or second 
home) and the first $100,000 of home equity debt.16 Although the TCJA has scaled 
back the mortgage interest deduction,17 the location of residence continues to have 
no impact on the size or availability of the deduction, except insofar as the popula-
tions that claim the deduction tend to live in certain place and not others. Middle- 
and upper-income taxpayers—and especially White taxpayers—are far more likely 
to benefit from the mortgage interest deduction than lower income taxpayers and 
minorities.18  
In contrast, the LIHTC is not place-neutral.19 As explained in Part III.B, the avail-
ability and size of the LIHTC varies by location due to a combination of federal tax 
                                                                                                                
direct subsidy programs. See Thuronyi, supra, at 1155. Surrey failed to instigate a wholesale 
repeal of tax expenditure programs, but his basic insight that tax expenditures “serve ends 
similar in nature to those served by direct government expenditure or loan programs” has 
helped shape the values of tax scholars and policymakers. See Surrey, supra, at 706. 
Meanwhile, there may be a number of advantages to administering these housing subsidies 
through the tax system. In the case of the mortgage interest deduction, homeowners—and 
especially the wealthy homeowners who claim the mortgage interest deduction—are in contact 
with the IRS each year during the tax filing process. As a result, the IRS already has procedures 
in place to collect or refund their taxes. By contrast, administering the program as a direct 
subsidy would at minimum require new procedures. 
14. See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of the American Dream, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 
329, 334 (2009); Daniel Hemel & Kyle Rozema, Inequality and the Mortgage Interest 
Deduction, 70 TAX L. REV. 667, 668–70 (2017); Tracy A. Kaye, Sheltering Social Policy in 
the Tax Code: The Low-Income Housing Credit, 38 VILL. L. REV. 871, 885–900 (1993); 
Leviner, supra note 12, at 875–81; Ventry, supra note 12, at 252–54. 
15. But see Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The Hidden Costs 
of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347 (2000) (discussing the en-
vironmental costs of suburban sprawl incentivized by the mortgage interest deduction). 
16. I.R.C. § 163(h) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
17. For debt incurred after December 15, 2017, home equity indebtedness interest is no 
longer allowed to be deducted and acquisition indebtedness interest deductions are capped at 
$750,000. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(F). 
18. Brown, supra note 14, at 333. The primary reason why White taxpayers are more 
likely to benefit from the mortgage interest deduction is that the demographic of higher-in-
come taxpayers who itemize tax deductions are disproportionately White. See id. at 361. 
However, White taxpayers may also be favored over non-White taxpayers of the same income 
level because Whites are disproportionately likely to be homeowners. See id. at 334–35. 
19. Most investment subsidies are uniform regardless of geography. For example, tax in-
centives to invest in renewable energy projects are uniform regardless of location. See
Michelle D. Layser, Improving Tax Incentives for Wind Energy Production: The Case for a 
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law and state administrative procedures.20 Given the LIHTC program’s history as a 
replacement for a failed federal public housing program blamed for exacerbating ur-
ban poverty,21 the locational aspects of the LIHTC have been of great interest to those 
who research urban planning and poverty. Some have suggested that the LIHTC pro-
gram actively contributes to economic and racial segregation, and, in fact, several 
states have begun to make changes to their allocation procedures to help mitigate 
                                                                                                                
Refundable Production Tax Credit, 81 MO. L. REV. 453, 455, 507 (2016). 
20. To avoid subsidizing affordable housing development beyond budget goals, federal 
law limits the LIHTC in each state by a cap on total credit allocations. I.R.C. § 42(h)(3) 
(Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-140). Each state receives a limited amount of credits to 
allocate to eligible taxpayers, and in most cases the allocations are made pursuant to a compe-
titive bidding process. I.R.C. § 43(h)(4). To participate in the competitive bidding process, 
affordable housing developers submit applications describing their proposed projects to their 
state housing agency, and the state housing agency then allocates the LIHTCs to eligible pro-
jects using priorities set forth in the state’s qualified allocation plan. See J. William Callison, 
Achieving Our Country: Geographic Desegregation and the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit,
19 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 213, 231–33 (2010).
21. In the 1980s, several high-profile examples of failed public housing projects had re-
ceived national attention, including the Pruitt-Igoe project in St. Louis and the Cabrini-Green 
public housing projects in Chicago. See Colin Marshall, Pruitt-Igoe: The Troubled High-Rise 
That Came To Define Urban America – A History of Cities in 50 Buildings, Day 21, GUARDIAN
(Apr. 22, 2015, 7:52 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/apr/22/pruitt-igoe-high-
rise-urban-america-history-cities [https://perma.cc/35MD-9DK9]; Karen Hawkins, Chicago 
Shutters Infamous Public Housing Complex, NBC NEWS (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www. 
nbcnews.com/id/40450463/ns/us_news-life/t/chicago-shutters-infamous-public-housing-complex 
[https://perma.cc/XX2Q-G7WK]. Though some observers argued that critiques of public 
housing were exaggerated, contemporary news media described public housing as char-
acterized “by poverty, crime, segregation, poor living conditions and communal despair” and 
claimed they were “almost universally viewed as failures that devour human lives and tax 
dollars.” Stanley Ziemba, How Projects Rose to Failure, CHI. TRIBUNE (Dec. 2, 1986), http:// 
articles.chicagotribune.com/1986-12-02/news/8603310330_1_chicago-housing-authority-high-
rise-projects-public-housing [https://perma.cc/7JVP-2TML]; see also Charles E. Connerly, 
What Should be Done with the Public Housing Program?, 52 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 142 (1986).
In response, the Reagan administration effectively ended federal programs in support of low-
income rental housing by slashing the budget for the Section 8 tenant voucher program that 
had been introduced in the 1970s and by cutting the funding for new public housing projects. 
Robert Pear, Reagan’s Social Impact, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 1982), http://www.nytimes.com
/1982/08/25/us/reagan-s-social-impact-news-analysis.html [https://perma.cc/4T39-ZLR2];
Barry Zigas, Consumer Fed’n of Am., Learning from the Low Income Housing Tax Credit: 
Building a New Social Investment Model, COMM. DEV. INV. REV., Dec. 2013, at 43–55, 
http://www.frbsf.org/community-development/files/learning-low-income-housing-tax-credit-
building-new-social-investment-model.pdf [https://perma.cc/QE5G-H6H9]. Thus, U.S. housing 
policy began to shift away from public housing and toward housing built and operated by 
private owners who relied on generous tax benefits. Id. Early drafts of the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 eliminated the tax breaks associated with these tax shelters without offering any relief to 
investors, but a last-minute change to the bill introduced the LIHTC to mitigate the effect of 
repealing the tax breaks that had previously been available to investors in real estate projects. 
Gary Klott, Housing Tax Benefit Put in Bill, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 1986), http://
www.nytimes.com/1986/06/24/business/housing-tax-benefit-put-in-bill.html [https://perma
.cc/L6AF-WHB8].
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such effects.22 However, a narrow focus on the LIHTC program risks overlooking 
the less obvious ways that the mortgage interest deduction also helps reinforce eco-
nomic and racial segregation.  
This Article will demonstrate that the well-known equity problems presented by 
both the mortgage interest deduction and the LIHTC may be even worse than we 
thought23: the inequities presented by the mortgage interest deduction compound in-
equities presented by the LIHTC program—and, together, the tax law may exacer-
bate nontax forces that sustain residential segregation patterns. Describing the spatial 
distribution of these tax-based housing subsidies is the first step in the project of 
understanding how tax laws affect neighborhood composition and residential mobil-
ity. The answers to these questions are essential to evaluate the numerous proposals 
and reforms in this context, ranging from calls to repeal the mortgage interest deduc-
tion to a recent wave of changes to states’ LIHTC administrative procedures.  
Though such reforms are often considered separately, many are supported by the 
same normative assumption: tax policies should not contribute to inequality in our 
society. In the years since the civil rights era, many African American families have 
experienced downward social mobility while White families have achieved upward 
social mobility.24 One theory to explain this unsettling trajectory blames the effects 
                                                                                                                
22. See infra Part V.B. 
23. Because tax-based housing subsidies target Americans at both extremes of the income 
scale, they immediately raise distributional questions. The mortgage interest deduction deliv-
ers a benefit to homeowners by subsidizing the cost of financing home purchases, but almost 
three-quarters of the benefits are claimed by taxpayers in the top two quintiles of the income 
scale. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR TAX EXPENDITURES IN THE 
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX SYSTEM (2013), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-
congress-2013-2014/reports/taxexpendituresone-column.pdf [https://perma.cc/FZ9U-TFC6].
On the low end of the income scale, the LIHTC program delivers an indirect benefit to low-
income tenants who receive rent-controlled housing. I.R.C. § 42(c)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. 
L. No. 115-140). But in recent years, that program has delivered only $9 billion in subsidies 
annually (only part of which flows to low-income tenants themselves), not nearly enough to 
offset the distributional impact of the $72.4 billion that has been delivered each year to higher-
income homeowners through the mortgage interest deduction. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
JCX-3-17, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2016-2020, at 32
(2017). Although the TCJA has significantly scaled back the mortgage interest deduction, the 
tax break is still expected to deliver approximately $40.7 billion in subsidies to homeowners 
in 2018, an amount that far exceeds the $8.9 billion cost of the LIHTC. See JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, JCX-34-18, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2017-
2021, at 38-39 (2017). Note that LIHTC itself is claimed by owners of qualified low-income 
housing buildings during a ten-year compliance period. The size of the credit for any given 
year is determined by multiplying the adjusted basis of the eligible building by an “applicable 
percentage.” I.R.C. § 42(a). The applicable percentage is defined as the percentage “which 
will yield over a 10-year period amounts of credit . . . which will have a present value equal 
to . . . 70 percent of the qualified basis of a new building which is not federally subsidized for 
the taxable year . . . .” I.R.C. § 42(b)(1). For non-federally subsidized new buildings equals at 
least 9% of the qualified basis of each qualified low-income building. I.R.C. § 42(b)(2). A
qualified low-income housing building that is part of a project that meets one of two income-
based tests described in the statute.
24. SHARKEY, supra note 1, at 100–01. 
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of neighborhoods where Black and White people live.25 There is a strong sense in the 
literature that tax policies have also played a role in these outcomes.26 The remainder 
of this Article will endeavor to explain how the tax law might reinforce or reward 
economic and racial segregation. The next section will begin this task by reviewing 
the evidence about the spatial distribution of mortgage interest deduction benefits 
and LIHTC properties.  
B. The Location of Tax-Subsidized Housing in America 
1. The Spatial Distribution of Mortgage Interest Deduction Benefits 
Existing studies about the spatial distribution of tax-based housing subsidies have 
looked at the flow of benefits from the mortgage interest deduction or the location of 
LIHTC properties, but they have not yet brought those findings together to paint a 
comprehensive picture. Viewed together, these studies describe tax-based housing 
subsidies targeted to distinct populations that not only occupy different socioeco-
nomic and racial demographics but also live in neighborhoods and communities that 
rarely overlap geographically. For the purpose of understanding how the mortgage 
interest deduction and LIHTC can affect segregation patterns, city-level analyses are 
more useful than cross-state and cross-city analyses. Nevertheless, an analysis of the 
nationwide spatial distribution of tax-based housing subsidies helps shed light on 
what areas may be most vulnerable to their effects.  
The most comprehensive nation-level studies of the spatial distribution of the 
mortgage interest deduction began with the observation that the mortgage interest 
deduction, together with the state property tax deduction, “comes at a significant 
cost” that is well documented at the national level, but that the value of the subsidies 
“varies dramatically over space.”27 In other words, the spatial distribution of the 
                                                                                                                
25. Id. at 5–7. Sharkey distinguishes among geographic mobility, residential mobility, 
and contextual mobility and emphasizes contextual mobility for the purpose of his study. By 
contextual mobility, Sharkey refers to neighborhood types and focuses on whether people 
move from one type of neighborhood (e.g., a low-quality neighborhood) to another (e.g., a 
high-quality neighborhood). If people tend to move to neighborhoods of similar types, then 
there is minimal contextual mobility in Sharkey’s analysis. This Article refers simply to resi-
dential mobility and focuses on how the tax law may affect neighborhood options or impact 
neighborhood composition.  
26. See, e.g., LANCE FREEMAN, BROOKINGS INST. CTR. ON URBAN & METRO. POLICY, 
SITING AFFORDABLE HOUSING: LOCATION AND NEIGHBORHOOD TRENDS OF LOW INCOME 
HOUSING TAX CREDIT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 1990S (2004); Casey Dawkins, The Spatial 
Pattern of Low Income Housing Tax Credit Properties: Implications for Fair Housing and 
Poverty Deconcentration Policies, 79 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N. 222, 222 (2013); Mann, supra note 
15, at 1358.  
27. Todd Sinai & Joseph Gyourko, (Un)Changing Geographical Distribution of Housing 
Tax Benefits: 1980-2000, 18 TAX POL’Y ECON. 175, 176 (2004); see also Joseph Gyourko & 
Todd Sinai, The Spatial Distribution of Housing-Related Ordinary Income Tax Benefits, 31 
REAL EST. ECON. 527 (2003).  
2018] TAX LAW REWARDS HOUSING SEGREGATION 925
mortgage interest deduction implies a redistribution of value from foregone tax rev-
enue—a cost borne in varying degrees by taxpayers nationwide—in order to dispro-
portionately benefit taxpayers in a limited number of locations.28  
Most of those states are located in the Northeast or West Coast, indicating that 
those regions receive a disproportionate share of mortgage interest deduction bene-
fits nationally.29 Homeowners in Hawaii, District of Columbia, California, 
Connecticut, New York, and Massachusetts received greater subsidies than home-
owners in other states. Meanwhile, most of the states where homeowners received 
the least benefit from tax-based housing subsidies are located in the South and 
Midwest.30 These results suggest that the impact of the mortgage interest deduction 
will be felt more in the Northeast and West Coast, and it will have the least impact 
on the South and Midwest regions. 
The spatial distribution also varies dramatically across and within cities.31 Again, 
gross benefits disproportionately flow to metropolitan areas located in the Northeast 
                                                                                                                
28. Another way to think about this redistributive effect is that, in lieu of the $84 billion 
tax expenditure that benefits a subset of the population, the government could instead distrib-
ute that same $84 billion across the population. Perhaps the $84 billion would be distributed 
as an equal lump sum to every taxpayer, or maybe each taxpayers’ payout would be adjusted 
up or down in accordance with his or her marginal tax rate. In either case, the foregone distri-
bution under the real-life scenario (where the $84 billion is instead dedicated to the mortgage 
interest deduction program) can be conceptualized as the program cost borne by every tax-
payer. Conceptualized in this way, the value a homeowner receives from the mortgage interest 
deduction is offset by his or her share of the overall program costs. For this reason, the re-
searchers calculated the value of benefits net of program costs under certain assumptions. 
Gyourko & Sinai, supra note 27, at 528. Under the simplest assumption, every household was 
assumed to “pay” the same $2092 lump sum to finance the program. Id. They noted that under 
that assumption, the distribution of net benefits from the mortgage interest deduction and state 
property tax deduction ranged from negative $1175 per owned unit in South Dakota to $8626 
in Hawaii. Id. at 529. Under an alternative assumption, homeowner households’ contribution 
to the program cost was adjusted to take into account progressive marginal tax rates, whereby 
higher-income taxpayers bore a larger share of program costs and received greater value from 
the subsidies. By bringing taxpaying households’ costs and benefits into proportion, this as-
sumption helped minimize the effect of progressivity on the spatial analysis. Under that as-
sumption, net benefits ranged from negative $253 per owner in Indiana to $7035 per owner in 
Hawaii; the value in South Dakota was negative $27. Id. at 529, 542–43. Moreover, under that 
assumption homeowners in forty-one states and the District of Columbia received positive net 
benefits from the program, while homeowners in the remaining states received no net benefit 
from the program. Id. at 542–43. 
29. Sinai & Gyourko, supra note 27, at 204. 
30. Gyourko & Sinai, supra note 27, at 542–43 tbl.2. Under the lump sum assumption, 
the five states receiving the least benefits were South Dakota, North Dakota, West Virginia, 
Mississippi, Wyoming, and Oklahoma. Id. Under the proportional assumption, homeowners 
in the following nine states received negative net benefit from the program: Indiana, Kansas, 
West Virginia, Iowa, Oklahoma, Alabama, Mississippi, South Dakota, and Nebraska. Id.
31. Id. at 529. The Gyourko and Sinai study has some limitations. The study was pub-
lished over a decade before the IRS began publishing mortgage interest deduction tax return 
data broken down by zip code. For this reason, their studies relied on a series of estimates and 
assumptions inferred from 1990 census-tract data. Among the limitations of their data was the 
inability to determine which homeowners itemized their tax returns (in order to actually claim 
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and West Coast.32 Within many large cities, the distribution of mortgage interest de-
duction benefits disproportionately flows to a small portion of the population.33 For 
example, in Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Houston, and Philadelphia, as much as 70% of 
benefits flow to 25% of the owners in the area.34 This effect is most common in 
coastal areas and highly populated cities.35
Finally, Philadelphia has been used as a case study to help illustrate the intracity 
distribution of tax-based housing subsidies. The researchers noted that 84% of the 
region’s $2.7 billion estimated tax benefits accrued to suburban homeowners.36
Within Philadelphia, the top five percent of census tracts “received roughly the same 
amount of aggregate benefit as the bottom 60 percent,” suggesting that the distribu-
tion of tax-based housing subsidies in the city was highly concentrated.37 These pat-
terns were consistent with what has been observed elsewhere in the Northeast, a re-
gion that may be especially vulnerable to harms caused by the mortgage interest 
deduction due to the disproportionate amount of benefits flowing to the area. As such, 
this case study and the other studies reviewed in this section supported the choice to 
use Philadelphia as an illustrative case to study the mortgage interest deduction for 
                                                                                                                
the deduction) or to say with certainty what marginal tax rate should be applied. Id. In a sub-
sequent study, the same researchers applied a similar approach to estimate the change in spatial 
distribution over time by comparing data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 censuses. See 
generally Sinai & Gyourko, supra note 27. They found that although marginal tax rates had 
changed over time, the spatial targeting of the subsidies remained relatively consistent and 
heavily concentrated in California and the Boston-New York corridor. Id. at 176. The disparity 
in value between those high-benefit areas and lower-benefit areas had expanded over time, 
however, and they attributed that result to high and rising housing prices. Id.
32. Gyourko & Sinai, supra note 27, at 529 (explaining that benefits disproportionately 
flowed to the Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, New York-Northern New Jersey, and 
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose areas). The most per-owner gross benefits were received by 
homeowners in the New York-Northern Jersey Combined Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(MSA), and the least were received by non-MSA parts of Texas. Id. at 546–48. Out of 312 
MSAs in the study, homeowners in only 30 MSAs receive gross benefits in excess of the mean 
for the nation. Id.
33. Id. at 551 (“[I]n some metropolitan areas, the distribution of gross housing subsidy 
flow is fairly uniform, while in others, including many of the largest cities, a small portion of 
the population captures the bulk of the tax benefits.”). 
34. Id. at 552. 
35. Id.
36. JOSEPH GYOURKO & TODD SINAI, BROOKINGS INST. ON URBAN & METRO. POLICY, THE 
SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSING-RELATED TAX BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (2001), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/gyourko.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/28MD-4NGQ].
37. Id. at 17. When the program costs borne by homeowners and renters in Philadelphia 
are taken into account, the city had a sizeable negative net benefit under their analysis. In the 
aggregate, Philadelphia households (owners and renters) were estimated to “pay nearly $650 
million more in program costs than they receive in tax benefits.” Id. at 16. They note that 
homeownership rates probably do not account for these results, as “[t]ax benefit values in 
Philadelphia tend to be relatively low even though the home ownership rate is high compared 
to many other large central cities.” Id.
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this Article. As set forth in Part II below, my own calculations are generally con-
sistent with the findings of the studies described in this section.38  
2. The Spatial Distribution of Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Projects 
The spatial distribution of LIHTC properties is almost a mirror-image of the dis-
tribution of tax-based subsidies for owner-occupied housing. A HUD report on 
LIHTC projects placed in service by 2006 noted that the highest percentage of 
LIHTC properties were in the South (33.5%), followed by the Midwest (27.6%), 
West (20.3%), and Northeast (18.7%).39 Of those projects, 44.9% were located in 
central cities, 37% were suburban, and 13.1% were non-metro.40 One study found 
that, on the national level only about 8.5% to 12.2% of the nation’s LIHTC properties 
were placed in high-poverty census tracts (with poverty rates of at least 40%), while 
about one-third were sited in low-poverty census tracts (with poverty rates of less 
than 10%).41  
However, the distribution of LIHTC units reveals large disparities between urban 
and non-urban locations, especially in the Northeast, where 61.2% of LIHTC units 
are in central cities.42 Within many cities, and especially in the Northeast and
Midwest, LIHTC properties are often located in high-poverty areas.43 Moreover, 
LIHTC properties in many cities—especially in the Northeast—are not only located 
in high-poverty areas, but they are also clustered.44 In New York City, for example, 
the “typical” LIHTC property was located in a neighborhood with almost the exact 
same poverty rate as the typical neighborhood inhabited by low-income residents in 
the city, indicating that the LIHTC properties have been targeted to poor neighbor-
hoods in that city.45  
New York is not an exception; the researchers identified forty metropolitan cities 
where the majority of LIHTC properties were located in tracts with poverty rates of 
                                                                                                                
38. See infra Part II.A (estimating that 88.25% of Philadelphia-region mortgage interest 
deduction benefits flowed to the suburbs and the top 20% of the city’s zip codes captured 44% 
of the city’s mortgage interest deduction value (as compared to the 29% of value captured by 
the bottom 60% of zip codes)). 
39. ABT ASSOCS. INC., UPDATING THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT (LIHTC)
DATABASE: PROJECTS PLACED IN SERVICE THROUGH 2006, at 38 (2009), http://www. 
huduser.gov/portal/datasets/lihtc/report9506.pdf [https://perma.cc/UE23-FP5U] (prepared for 
the U.S. Dep’t of Housing and Urban Dev.).
40. Id. at 43. The researchers noted that this distribution is similar to the distribution of 
occupied housing stock generally. Id.
41. Ingrid Gould Ellen, Katherine M. O’Regan & Ioan Voicu, Siting, Spillovers, and 
Segregation: A Reexamination of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program, in HOUSING 
MARKETS AND THE ECONOMY: RISK, REGULATION, AND POLICY 233, 242 (Edward L. Glaeser 
& John M. Quigley eds., 2009). 
42. ABT ASSOCS. INC., supra note 39, at 43.  
43. Ellen et al., supra note 41, at 243; Dawkins, supra note 26, at 231. 
44. Dawkins, supra note 26, at 231. One study looked at the distribution of LIHTC prop-
erties in ten metropolitan areas and noted that in seven of the ten cities studied, the properties 
were more clustered than expected. Id.
45. Ellen et al., supra note 41, at 244. 
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thirty percent or more.46 Other researchers have noted further that “LIHTC units 
are still more likely than other rental units to be located in minority 
neighborhoods,” pointing to HUD data from 2005 that showed “nearly 43% of all 
LIHTC units are in neighborhoods with over 50% minority populations,” a number 
that “increases to 60% for LIHTC units located in central cities.”47 Part III will 
analyze features of LIHTC design that may help explain why LIHTC properties in 
many cities—and especially Northeastern cities—tend to be located and clustered 
in segregated areas.  
In sum, the existing locational research on tax-based housing subsidies reflects 
a spatial distribution of benefits in which the neighborhoods that receive the most 
value from the mortgage interest deduction tend not to overlap with areas with 
LIHTC properties, especially in metropolitan areas. Lest the full impact of this 
statement be lost in the statistics, the next part will present visualizations of the 
spatial distribution of LIHTC properties and mortgage interest deduction benefits 
in and around the city of Philadelphia. Though others have mapped LIHTC 
properties or mortgage interest deductions separately, the maps presented here are 
innovative in that they overlay the data to present a more comprehensive 
visualization of the flow of these tax-based housing subsidies.  
II. VISUALIZING THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF TAX-BASED HOUSING SUBSIDIES
A. The Big Picture: Mapping Tax-Based Housing Subsidies 
The empirical evidence reviewed in Part I is telling; however, the story can be 
told even more powerfully through visuals that illustrate the spatial distribution of 
these two tax-based housing subsidies and provide the basis for a closer look at the 
neighborhoods where the benefits flow. This section will present visualizations I 
created using the mapping program ArcGIS. Other researchers have also mapped 
the location of LIHTC properties in Philadelphia;48 however, I chose to layer those 
points over a heat map showing the flow of the mortgage interest deduction. First, 
I created a heat map of Philadelphia using IRS data about mortgage interest 
deduction claims in 2014, the most recently available data.49 Then, I layered the 
                                                                                                                
46. Id. at 244 n.26; Deirdre Oakley, Locational Patterns of Low-Income Housing Tax 
Credit Developments: A Sociospatial Analysis of Four Metropolitan Areas, 43 URB. AFF. REV. 
599, 605–06 (2008) (reviewing the literature and observing that research supports the exist-
ence of similar patterns in Austin, Cincinnati, Miami, St. Louis, Chicago, Seattle, Cleveland, 
Baltimore, and Washington D.C.).  
47. Callison, supra note 20, at 245. 
48. See, e.g., Benjamin Field, Why Low-Income Housing Tax Credits Are Flowing to 
Gentrifying Neighborhoods (May 13, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn 
.com/abstract=2778182 [https://perma.cc/886G-UJPY].
49. The IRS publicly releases data about the amount of mortgage interest claimed by tax-
payers in certain income ranges. However, the income ranges provided by the IRS sometimes 
span multiple tax brackets. Since the value of a deduction is determined by multiplying the 
size of a deduction by the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate, this limitation makes it impossible to 
calculate the exact value of mortgage interest deduction benefits. It is also impossible to tell 
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locations of LIHTC properties provided by HUD over the heat map.50 The benefits 
are twofold. First, the maps shed light on where tax-based housing subsidies are 
going—and what neighborhoods stand to benefit or lose if the law is reformed. 
Second, the maps reveal real, physical distance and segregation between the 
populations targeted for these subsidies. 
Other researchers have focused on Philadelphia when studying the mortgage 
interest deduction or LIHTC properties, and there is good reason to think that 
Philadelphia is a relatively typical case within the Northeast.51 Northeastern and 
West Coast cities are more likely than cities in other regions to have a history of 
segregation that is still visible in the residential patterns,52 so policies that further 
exacerbate the traditional segregation patterns or present barriers to integration are 
particularly troublesome in this context. Yet, Northeastern cities are also most 
likely to have clusters of LIHTC properties in very low-income urban locations53
and to receive more value from the mortgage interest deduction than much of the 
county.54 For these reasons, any problems with tax-based housing subsidies are 
likely to be especially pronounced in this region. As such, Philadelphia serves as a 
particularly apt case for demonstrating the potential dangers presented by the 
mortgage interest deduction and LIHTC program.  
The map in Figure 1 below displays the estimated gross benefit from mortgage 
interest deduction benefits received by each zip code in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, and seven surrounding counties in 2014 (with the darkest areas 
receiving the most value): Bucks, Burlington, Camden, Chester, Delaware, 
Gloucester, and Montgomery. The locations of LIHTC properties (new 
construction and rehabilitation projects) are overlaid as white dots, helping to 
illustrate and bring together the empirical observations made in the studies 
described above. 
                                                                                                                
from the data whether the taxpayers that claimed the mortgage interest deduction filed as in-
dividuals, joint filers, or otherwise. Finally, it is impossible to tell from the data what other 
deductions a taxpayer may have claimed to further lower its marginal tax rate. For these rea-
sons, I estimated the value of benefits by assuming the lowest marginal tax rate covered by 
the income range provided by the IRS. Because these estimates are conservative, it is likely 
that some zip codes received more value from the mortgage interest deduction than I estimated. 
50. The HUD data contains one address per project, which may fail to fully capture some 
scattered site projects; therefore, it is likely that at least some smaller LIHTC properties are 
not depicted on these maps. 
51. The conclusions by Gyourko and Sinai (in a Philadelphia case study of mortgage in-
terest deduction benefits) and by Field (in a Philadelphia case study of LIHTC properties) were 
generally consistent with more general research. See, e.g., Ellen et al., supra note 41; Field, 
supra note 48, at 243–44; Gyourko & Sinai, supra note 27. 
52. Kevin D. Williamson, Shocked by Segregation, NAT’L REV. (Aug. 24, 2016), http:// 
www.nationalreview.com/article/439291/economic-segregation-greatest-democrat-controlled-
cities [https://perma.cc/DEC9-KBAV]. 
53. See supra Part I.B.2. 
54. See supra Part I.B.1. 
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Key Quintile Estimated Total MID Value
Received by Zip Code (2014)
1 $45,500 – $969,710
2 $969,710.01 – $2,458,430
3 $2,458,430.01– $4,487,990
4 $4,487,990.01 – $8,610,130
5 $8,610,130.01 – $23,845,260
Figure 1. Philadelphia Metro Region Mortgage Interest Deduction Benefits and 
LIHTC Project Locations 
The map in Figure 1 reflects distributions of benefits that are as different in phys-
ical location as they are with respect to the populations they target. In 2014, about 
29% of the area’s population resided in the city of Philadelphia, which was about 
41.6% White55 and had a home ownership rate of about 52.9%;56 however, the city 
of Philadelphia received only about 11.75% of the area’s mortgage interest deduction 
value and was the site of 65.86% of the area’s LIHTC properties.57 The remaining 
                                                                                                                
55. American FactFinder Community Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https:// 
factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml [https://perma.cc/86CF-
ZJ2U] (search Philadelphia city, Pennsylvania > Demographic and Housing Estimates > 
2014). 
56. Id. (search Philadelphia city, Pennsylvania > Housing > American Community 
Survey Selected Housing Characteristics > 2014). 
57. Gyourko and Sinai had estimated that about 16% of mortgage interest deduction ben-
efits flow to Philadelphia city. GYOURKO & SINAI, supra note 36, at 15. Methodological dif-
ferences probably contribute to the disparity. Sinai and Gyourko relied on estimates inferred 
from home prices and income demographics because actual IRS claimant data was unavailable 
at the time of the study. This Article instead uses actual IRS claimant data from 2014 to esti-
mate the value of the deduction. Similarly, with respect to the LIHTC data, different results 
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88.25% of mortgage interest deduction benefits flowed to the surrounding counties, 
and especially to Chester County, Bucks County and Montgomery County. In fact, 
almost a quarter (24.86%) of all mortgage interest deduction value flowed to just 20
of the 318 zip codes studied, 14 of which are in Chester, Bucks or Montgomery 
county (and none are in the city of Philadelphia). 
County
Population
(% Area)
MID 
Value
(% Area)
LIHTC properties
(Number,
% Area)
Poverty
Rate
Percent
White
Philadelphia 28.76% 11.75% 465(65.86%) 25.8% 45.1%
Bucks 11.83% 16.44% 13 (1.84%) 6.6% 89.2%
Burlington 8.49% 10.27% 16 (2.27%) 7.2% 74%
Camden* 9.63% 8.26% 61 (8.64%) 13% 79.8%
Chester 9.73% 16.38% 43 (6.09%) 7.3% 86.4%
Delaware 10.63% 11.21% 63 (8.92%) 11% 70.6%
Gloucester 5.49% 5.72% 18 (2.55%) 8.2% 83.6%
Montgomery 15.44% 19.97% 27 (3.82%) 7.10% 80.6%
Table 1. Philadelphia Metro Region Mortgage Interest Deduction Benefits and 
LIHTC Project Locations 
Within the city of Philadelphia, the value of mortgage interest deduction benefits 
received by a zip code generally relates inversely to the number of LIHTC properties 
located in that zip code. As displayed in Figure 2 below, 70% of the value of mort-
gage interest deduction benefits are distributed to the top two quintiles of 
Philadelphia zip codes, while only 19% of LIHTC properties are built in those ar-
eas.58 In many instances, therefore, the distribution of tax-based subsidies in the 
Philadelphia region reflects not only physical distance between those who live in 
suburbs and urban centers, but also between those who live within the city itself. 
                                                                                                                
may be possible if LIHTC units are counted instead of LIHTC properties. For example, my 
own analysis of HUD’s data showed that only 47.42% of the area’s LIHTC-financed units are 
located in the city (as compared to the 65.86% of LIHTC properties noted here). While this 
may suggest that housing projects in the suburbs are larger and boast a greater number of low-
income units, the HUD data about unit characteristics is incomplete and that estimate may be 
inaccurate. Another possible source of inaccuracy is the effect of scattered site projects, in 
which multiple properties are built as part of a single project. The HUD data records only one 
address per project, so scattered site projects could alter the results.  
58. To create Figure 2, I sorted zip codes by the estimated mortgage interest deduction 
value and divided into quintiles. The first quintile consists of the one-fifth of zip codes that 
received the lowest estimated value from the mortgage interest deduction. Those zip codes 
collectively received only 3% of Philadelphia’s mortgage interest deduction benefits but were 
the location of 35% of the city’s LIHTC properties. The fifth quintile consists of the one-fifth 
of zip codes that received the highest estimated value from the mortgage interest deduction. 
That quintile received 44% of the city’s mortgage interest deduction benefits and was the lo-
cation of 14% of the city’s LIHTC properties. Source data on file with Author.
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Over 60% of the city’s LIHTC properties are clustered in ten of the city’s forty-seven 
zip codes, and eight of those ten zip codes are in the bottom-three quintiles for re-
ceiving mortgage interest deduction benefits. Figure 3 displays a scatterplot of every 
Philadelphia zip code showing the relationship between the number of LIHTC prop-
erties in a zip code versus the estimated amount of mortgage interest deduction value 
received by all taxpayers in the zip code. 
Figure 2. Percentage of MID Benefits and LIHTC Projects by Quintile of 
Philadelphia Zip Codes 
Figure 3. LIHTC Projects and Mortgage Interest Deduction Benefits by Philadelphia 
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The map in Figure 4 below displays the estimated value of mortgage interest de-
duction benefits in Philadelphia as a heat map (with the darker areas receiving the 
most value) and the location of LIHTC properties (new construction and rehabilita-
tion projects) overlaid to show the disparity.59  
Key Quintile Estimated Total MID Value
Received by Zip Code (2014)
1 $86,950 – $1,223,600
2 $1,223,600.01 – $2,225,500
3 $2,225,500.01– $3,723,160
4 $3,723,160.01 – $5,809,240
5 $5,809,240.01 – $11,666,710
Figure 4. Philadelphia City Mortgage Interest Deduction Benefits and LIHTC 
Project Locations  
                                                                                                                
59. For more on the mapping methodology, see supra notes 49–50 and accompanying 
text. 
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A few immediate observations can be made. First, most LIHTC properties ap-
pear in zip codes that are lightly shaded, indicating that they are the areas in the 
city estimated to receive the least aggregate value from the mortgage interest de-
duction. Second, with some exceptions, the LIHTC properties are generally located 
in the centermost parts of the city—the “inner city”—while most of the city’s mort-
gage interest deduction benefits flow to the far west and northern parts of the city 
that border Montgomery, Bucks, and Burlington counties. Third, as discussed in 
greater detail below, there are some notable exceptions to these patterns, especially 
in the South Philadelphia neighborhoods just south of Center City.  
The main benefit of mapping the flow of tax-based housing subsidies is that the 
exercise reveals the location of taxpayers who claim the mortgage interest deduc-
tion or who live in LIHTC properties. When neighborhoods have been described 
in the literature about tax-based housing subsidies, the descriptions have most often 
appeared in the context of the LIHTC. These studies have noted that the neighbor-
hoods where LIHTC properties are located often have higher than average poverty 
rates, high Black or Hispanic racial composition, and lower quality schools.60 Part 
II.A builds upon those studies by describing not only areas that boast the most 
LIHTC properties but also those that receive high proportions of mortgage interest 
deduction benefits or feature a mix of both types of subsidies. The subpart will 
begin with a brief description of the suburbs and the Philadelphia neighborhoods 
that claim the most value from the mortgage interest deduction. Then, I will briefly 
describe the inner-city neighborhoods with the most LIHTC properties, including 
some where LIHTC tenants and mortgage interest deduction claimants live in close 
proximity. 
B. A Closer Look: Describing Tax-Subsidized Neighborhoods 
1. Neighborhoods with High Shares of Mortgage Interest Deduction Benefits and 
Few LIHTC Properties 
Due to the significant variations of distributions across regions, states, and met-
ropolitan areas—not to mention the plethora of nontax legal, economic, and cultural 
differences among places—it is difficult to know with certainty how representative 
any given example might be. Nevertheless, neighborhood characteristics are 
pertinent to the evaluation of tax-based housing subsidies in terms of efficacy and 
                                                                                                                
60. FREEMAN, supra note 26, at 6–9; Deng, supra note 5, at 33; Oakley, supra note 46, at 
600. However, in a study of the relationship between the LIHTC program and neighborhood 
disadvantage, sociologist Diedre Oakley tested whether those and other neighborhood charac-
teristics—income, unemployment rate, racial composition, poverty rate—were predictive of 
the existence of LIHTC properties. Oakley, supra note 46, at 624. Oakley concluded that, for 
the most part, they were not statistically significant predictors of the presence of LIHTC de-
velopments. Id. In contrast, Oakley noted that the most predictive factor was the presence of 
qualified census tracts, suggesting “that a major contributing factor is the provision of the 
[qualified census tract] bonus, an integral policy component of the LIHTC program. Thus, a 
provision of the program designed to encourage private developers to provide affordable hous-
ing in the more disadvantaged neighborhoods has to some extent mitigated the secondary goal 
of providing more economic diversity in LIHTC neighborhoods.” Id.
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justice, and the descriptions that follow serve to expand our understanding of the 
places that receive tax-based housing subsidies. 
Take, for example, zip code 19335, which lies within the Philadelphia suburb 
Chester County. According to my analysis, the zip code was in the top quintile of 
zip codes that received value from the mortgage interest deduction in 2014. The 
area was overwhelmingly White and educated, with over half the adult population 
over age 25 having completed at least some college.61 The median household 
income was $89,984.62 The schools are among the best in the region. For example, 
schools in Downingtown, Pennsylvania, which is located within the zip code, are 
ranked 24 out of 101 schools in the Philadelphia area.63 The elementary school 
student body is predominantly White,64 and relatively few of the students have been 
identified as economically disadvantaged.65 One blog ranked Downingtown among 
the “best places for families to live in Pennsylvania.”66 In short, Downingtown is 
a high quality-of-life, middle- and upper-income, mostly White suburban city 
where residents experience little place-based disadvantage. There are no LIHTC 
properties in Downingtown or the rest of zip code 19335. 
Within Philadelphia, a relatively consistent story can be told about the places 
and people who receive the greatest benefit from the mortgage interest deduction: 
the communities are whiter, more affluent, and safer than the city’s average, and 
                                                                                                                
61. American FactFinder Community Facts, supra note 55 (search 19335 > Population 
> 2016 American Community Survey > Demographic and Housing Estimates > 2014) 
(reporting that 85.7% of single race households are White); Id. (search 19335 > Education 
> 2016 American Community Survey > Educational Attainment > 2014) (reporting that 
71.8% of the population over age 25 had achieved some college (14.8%), an associate’s 
degree (6.9%), a bachelor’s degree (32.1%) or a graduate or professional degree (18%)). 
Similarly, in zip code 19382, which under my analysis received the most mortgage interest 
deduction value in the region, 88.4% of the population was White., Id. (search 19382 > 
Population > 2016 American Community Survey > Demographic and Housing Estimates > 
2014) (reporting that 88.4% of single race households was White). Also in zip code 19382, 
of adults ages 18 to 24, 94.1% had achieved high school graduation or higher, and of adults 
over age 25, 95.4% had achieved high school graduation or higher. Id. (search 19382 > 
Education > 2016 American Community Survey > Educational Attainment > 2014).  
62. Id. (search 19335 > Income > Selected Economic Characteristics > 2014). 
63. Downingtown Area School District Rankings, NICHE, https://k12.niche.com/d 
/downingtown-area-school-district-pa/rankings [https://perma.cc/UFU8-3TAB] (ranking 
the Downingtown Area School District #24 of 101 schools in the Philadelphia metro 
region). 
64. Downington Area SD, PA. SCH. PERFORMANCE PROFILE, http://paschool 
performance.org/Profile/135 [https://perma.cc/WC8Z-8VQU] (as of 2018, 77.01% of 
students are White; 3.18% are Black; 4.73% are Hispanic).  
65. Id. (identifying 10.31% of the students as economically disadvantaged as of 2018). 
66. Richie Bernardo, 2016’s Best Places for Families To Live in Pennsylvania, WALLET 
HUB (Feb. 24, 2016), https://wallethub.com/edu/best-places-to-live-in-pennsylvania/19252 
[https://perma.cc/4AWQ-NDQW]. 
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though the neighborhoods are within the city limits, many “feel” suburban.67 Adults 
in these communities are highly educated, and they take no chances on the education 
of their children, many of whom evidentially attend private schools.68 The public 
elementary schools in these communities often have mixed-race demographics, 
making them more integrated than either the featured schools in the suburbs (which 
are mostly White) or the featured schools in the inner city (which are mostly Black 
and Hispanic).69 To the extent that integrated schools are important for promoting 
equal educational opportunities for minority youth, the schools in these areas may be 
better than many in the region. But again, these are not the areas where LIHTC 
properties are located.70  
                                                                                                                
67. See, e.g., Andorra, PLANPHILLY, http://planphilly.com/neighborhoods/Andorra 
[https://perma.cc/T6WW-GNL2] (describing one of the neighborhoods in the zip code 
receiving the highest amount of mortgage interest deduction benefits as a neighborhood that 
“resembles suburban Montgomery County more than Philadelphia city neighborhoods”).
68. For example, elementary-aged children in Roxborough (a neighborhood in zip code 
19128, which receives a high proportion of mortgage interest deduction benefits) are zoned 
for Shawmont Elementary School, which is 42.72% White and 38.89% Black despite the 
neighborhood demographics, suggesting that many White families in the area send their 
children to private schools. Shawmont Sch, PA. SCH. PERFORMANCE PROFILE, http:// 
paschoolperformance.org/Profile/6930 [https://perma.cc/QR7C-L5T5]; What Do You Think 
About Buying of Roxborough? (Philadelphia: Short Sales, Real Estate Market), CITY-
DATA.COM (July 21, 2008), http://www.city-data.com/forum/philadelphia/385399-what-do-
you-think-about-buying.html [https://perma.cc/KL6W-XU8J]. 
69. See Shawmont Sch, supra note 68. Similarly, students in zip codes 19115 and 19154 
(which also receive a high proportion of mortgage interest deduction benefits) are zoned for 
Stephen Decatur School (58.2% White, 16.29% Black as of 2018), Aloysius L. Fitzpatrick 
School (54.06% White, 18.46% Black), Anne Frank School (40.02% White, 15.76% Black 
as of 2018), and Joseph Greenberg School (49.6% White, 14.32% Black as of 2018). PA.
SCH. PERFORMANCE PROFILE, http://paschoolperformance.org [https://perma.cc/BRQ8-
F4HL]. In 2018, the population of those zip codes are 78.4% and 85.8% White, respectively. 
American FactFinder Community Facts, supra note 55 (search 19115 > Population > 2016 
American Community Survey > Demographic and Housing Estimates > 2014) (reporting 
that 78.4% of single race households was White); Id. (search 19154 > Population > 2016 
American Community Survey > Demographic and Housing Estimates > 2014) (reporting 
that 85.8% of single race households was White).  These zip codes are zoned for George 
Washington High school, which is 41.01% White, 28.31% Black, and 11.59% Hispanic. 
Washington George HS, PA. SCH. PERFORMANCE PROFILE, http://paschoolperformance 
.org/Profile/6958 [https://perma.cc/L6WP-9WBJ]. 
70. For example, the Fox Chase/Burhome neighborhoods only have two LIHTC properties, 
both of which are reserved for seniors. See HUD, Center Park Ii, RENTALHOUSINGDEALS,
http://www.rentalhousingdeals.com/PA/PHILADELPHIA/CENTER-PARK-II [https://perma 
.cc/H3NR-7H25] (profile of Center Park II affordable housing project in Burholme); Press 
Release, Inglis, Inglis & Medical Mission Sisters Partner on Affordable Housing: 61 Units 
Planned for Mobility-Impaired and Low Income Retirees (June 14, 2013), https://www.inglis.org 
/images/uploads/general/2013-06-14_MissionGreen_Combined_Release.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/SQZ2-FQYN] (press release announcing plans for Mission Green affordable senior 
housing project in Fox Chase). 
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2. Neighborhoods with High Numbers of LIHTC Properties and Little Mortgage 
Interest Deduction Benefit 
The highest concentrations of LIHTC properties are found in West Philadelphia 
and Lower North Philadelphia, each of which contain multiple discrete neighbor-
hoods,71 most of which are situated within the lowest quintile of Philadelphia zip 
codes receiving mortgage interest deduction benefits. And most are predominantly 
minority neighborhoods with low-quality schools and higher than average crime 
rates. According to on my own analysis, just two West Philadelphia zip codes 
—19104 and 19139—are the site of 86 (18%) of the city’s LIHTC properties and the 
recipient of just 1.39% of the city’s estimated mortgage interest deduction benefits.72
While there is no way, in the limited space available for this Article, to look at all the 
neighborhoods in these or similar zip codes in detail, a description of a couple will 
suffice for illustration. 
Just northwest of University City, the home of University of Pennsylvania and 
Drexel University campuses, are several neighborhoods with a high concentration of 
LIHTC properties. One of those neighborhoods is Mantua, a neighborhood set apart 
from the rest of West Philadelphia by bridges.73 More than half of Mantua resi-
dents—and 96% of children under five—live below the poverty line, and the neigh-
borhood is the location of ten LIHTC properties.74 Elementary-age children in 
Mantua attend Morton McMichael School, the student body of which is 92.29% 
Black and 77% economically disadvantaged.75 The elementary school has been des-
ignated by the state as “low-achieving” based on state standardized test scores.76
                                                                                                                
71. The West Philadelphia neighborhoods with the most LIHTC properties include 
Mantua, Belmont, West Powelton, Haverford North, and East Parkside—all of which share a 
zip code (zip code 19104) with University City where the University of Pennsylvania is lo-
cated—as well as Walnut Hill (zip code 19139), Dunlap (zip code 19139), Haddington (zip 
code 19131), Carroll Park (zip code 19131), and Cobbs Creek (zip code 19139). See supra 
Fig. 4; see also infra text accompanying note 72. While LIHTC properties are scattered 
throughout North Philadelphia, high concentrations can also be found in Strawberry Mansion, 
North Central, Stanton, and Hartrantf. 
72. Data on file with author. 
73. Kate Kilpatrick, In Blighted Mantua, a History of Poverty, Crime and Pride, AL
JAZEERA AM. (Jan. 28, 2014, 10:30 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/1/28 
/obama-philadelphiapromizezonesmantua.html [https://perma.cc/ZH3H-7GYE]. Mantua is 
located in zip code 19104. 
74. Id.
75. McMichael Morton Sch., PA. SCH. PERFORMANCE PROFILE, http:// 
paschoolperformance.org/Profile/6865 [https://perma.cc/B88U-AZB5]. 
76. Id.; PA. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2015–16 OPPORTUNITY SCHOLARSHIP TAX CREDIT 
PROGRAM—LIST OF LOW ACHIEVING SCHOOLS, http://www.education.pa.gov/Documents/K-
12/Opportunity%20Scholarship%20Tax%20Credit%20Program/2015-16%20OSTCP%20-
%20List%20of%20Low%20Achieving%20Schools.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7SS-24PU]. The 
neighborhood middle school is not much better. In 2013, only 27% of graduating eighth grad-
ers scored proficient or above in math and only 36% scored as proficient in reading. Kilpatrick, 
supra note 73. 
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One reporter described Mantua as of 2014 saying, “Drugs, crime, violence, incar-
ceration and blight are all too familiar. A colorful recreation center and popular pub-
lic library serve as community hubs but are surrounded by blocks of homes in disre-
pair, many of them boarded up, in varying stages of collapse.”77 In 2015, Mantua 
ranked number four out of fifty-five Philadelphia neighborhoods for the most violent 
crimes.78 Health statistics for Mantua and the bordering neighborhood of Belmont, 
which is the location of nine LIHTC properties, have reflected higher than average 
rates of heart disease and babies born with low birth weight.79
The schools in another West Philadelphia neighborhood with a high number of 
LIHTC properties,80 Haddington, have been described as “among the worst in the 
city, according to the school district’s yearly progress reports.”81 The three neighbor-
hood high schools are “ranked in the bottom quartile of city schools, and among the 
10 worst in terms of college and career readiness.”82 All three high schools have a 
highly segregated student body and a high percentage of economically disadvantaged 
students and safety problems.83
                                                                                                                
77. Kilpatrick, supra note 73. 
78. Crime in Philadelphia, PHILA. INQUIRER, http://data.philly.com/philly/crime/?from=2015-
01-01&to=2015-12-31&nType=crime&dNeigh=Mantua [https://perma.cc/2FGY-HQB3] 
(interactive graphic). The violent crime rate was 1.62 per 1000 people, for a total of 203 
violent crimes that included 3 homicides, 18 rapes, 43 robberies, and 172 assaults in a single 
year. Id. In addition, the neighborhood was the site of 377 property crimes, making it the 
Philadelphia neighborhood with the twenty-second highest rate of crimes like burglary, 
theft, and auto theft. Id.
79. While recent neighborhood-level data is not publicly available, the rate of heart dis-
ease in Mantua and Belmont in 2000 were 4/1000 residents and 4.8/1000 residents, respec-
tively, as compared to 3.1/1000 residents in Philadelphia as a whole. BRITT FREMSTAD, JODINE 
GORDON, JOSH HOFFMAN, HOLLIS SAVAGE, PAUL VADE STOUWE & ANDY TURNER, THE 
QUALITY OF LIFE IN TWO WEST PHILADELPHIA NEIGHBORHOODS: THE CASE OF BELMONT AND 
MANTUA 55–56 (2006) http://www.archives.upenn.edu/histy/features/upwphil/belmont 
_mantua.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TRE-CZJV]. Mothers in both neighborhoods were almost 
three times as likely as mothers in the rest of Philadelphia to give birth with late or no prenatal
care, and in Mantua the rate of births with low birth weight was twice as high as in Philadelphia 
as a whole. Id.
80. There are nineteen LIHTC properties in Haddington. 
81. Max Marin, The Philly Neighborhood Where Household Income Has Crumbled,
PHILLY VOICE (June 24, 2016), http://www.phillyvoice.com/philly-neighborhood-household-
income-declines-55-percent-2000 [https://perma.cc/FZ3B-WDXZ]. 
82. Id.
83. West Philadelphia High School students are 96.44% Black and 89% economically 
disadvantaged; Overbrook High School students are 96.84% Black and 80% economically 
disadvantaged; and William L. Sayre High School students are 95.65% Black and 83% 
economically disadvantaged. West Philadelphia HS, PA. SCH. PERFORMANCE PROFILE,
http://paschoolperformance.org/Profile/6964 [https://perma.cc/GU6U-MZPE]; Overbrook 
HS, PA. SCH. PERFORMANCE PROFILE, http://paschoolperformance.org/Profile/6887 [https:// 
perma.cc/VT96-66QF]; Sayre William L MS, PA. SCH. PERFORMANCE PROFILE, http:// 
paschoolperformance.org/Profile/6924 [https://perma.cc/NBA4-22TB]. In the 2014–2015 
school year, Overbrook High School reported 86 incidents involving 120 students, where 65 
incidents involved law enforcement officers and 30 resulted in arrests. Safe Schools - School 
Report, SAFE SCHOOLS ONLINE (Oct. 28, 2015, 10:04 AM), https://www.safeschools.state 
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Many of Philadelphia’s LIHTC properties are in neighborhoods like these. These 
neighborhoods highlight the distance—physically, economically, and socially—be-
tween the homeowners who receive mortgage interest deduction benefits and the ten-
ants who live in LIHTC properties. As explained in Part I.B, the clustering of LIHTC 
properties is a documented problem in many cities, and especially in northeastern 
cities like Philadelphia. Residents who live in neighborhoods like these experience 
communities that are, in many respects, segregated: the neighborhood population and 
school student bodies are disproportionately comprised by Black or Hispanic minor-
ities. The adult populations are less likely to be highly educated and more likely to 
have low incomes or be in poverty. The neighborhoods have higher crime rates and 
higher than average rates of illness, and the schools are lower quality. The residents 
of these neighborhoods experience clear place-based disadvantage relative to those 
who live in the neighborhoods that receive the most value from the mortgage interest 
deduction.  
3. Neighborhoods in Zip Codes with Both LIHTC Properties and High Mortgage 
Interest Deduction Benefit 
In the rare cases when large numbers of LIHTC properties exist in Philadelphia 
zip codes that also receive a large share of mortgage interest deduction benefits, the 
apparent overlap is usually the result of gentrification—and what looks like integra-
tion based on zip-code level numbers tends to look much more segregated from the 
ground. Take adjacent zip codes 19146 and 19147, for example, each of which claim 
some of the highest value from the mortgage interest deduction in the city while also 
featuring twenty-six and ten LIHTC properties, respectively. These zip codes contain 
a long list of gentrified or gentrifying neighborhoods;84 however, an industry study 
                                                                                                                
.pa.us [https://perma.cc/7G4W-N7TY] (search School Safety > School Safety Historic > 2015 
> Public School/District Report > P > Philadelphia City SD > Overbrook HS). William Sayre 
reported similar numbers, with 70 incidents involving 110 students, where 39 incidents 
involved law enforcement and 20 resulted in arrests. Id. (search Philadelphia City SD > Sayre 
William L MS). In 2015, West Philadelphia High School reported 48 safety incidents, 21 of 
which involved law enforcement and 7 resulting in arrests. Id. (search Philadelphia City SD > 
West Philadelphia HS). 
84. These zip codes include the Graduate Hospital (or, “Southwest Center City”) neigh-
borhood; the “trendy” Fitler Square neighborhood; gentrifying neighborhoods called Passyunk 
Square and Point Breeze; and a long-gentrified wealthy neighborhood called Queen Village. 
Prudential Fox & Roach, Passyunk Square: Philadelphia’s Up-and-Coming Neighborhood,
PHILA. MAG.: PROP. (May 14, 2013), http://www.phillymag.com/property/2013/05/14 
/philadelphias-up-and-coming-neighborhood [https://perma.cc/YR8K-3GDH] (describes 
Passyunk Square as gentrified by young professionals); Dylan Gottlieb, Gentrification,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GREATER PHILA., http://philadelphiaencyclopedia.org/archive 
/gentrification [https://perma.cc/G4X4-CEHT]; Melissa Romero, Report: Philly’s Top 15
Gentrifying Neighborhoods, CURBED PHILA. (May 20, 2016, 9:00 AM), http:// 
philly.curbed.com/2016/5/20/11717308/philadelphia-top-gentrifying-neighborhoods [https:// 
perma.cc/QT2C-KZLA] (describes Graduate Hospital as rapidly gentrifying); Kevin C. 
Shelly, Devil’s Pocket Neighborhood Fading Away, PHILLY VOICE (Aug. 27, 2015), http:// 
www.phillyvoice.com/devils-pocket-neighborhood-fading-away [https://perma.cc/M3YL-
7ZMZ] (describes Fitler Square as “trendy”).
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of the effect of gentrification within these neighborhoods showed that gentrification 
did not create significantly more racial mixing, but rather moved Black-White 
boundary lines as the White population in these neighborhoods expanded.85
In some cases, the location of affordable housing projects has created the bound-
aries. This has been the case in the Queen Village neighborhood in zip code 19147, 
which features a single affordable housing project called the Courtyard Apartments, 
which was rehabilitated using the LIHTC.86 According to one account, “[p]rior to its 
demolition in 2000, the complex suffered from severely deteriorated infrastructure. 
Incinerators would clog frequently and spew foul smoke into the apartments, eleva-
tors worked only intermittently, and at least one of the towers experienced an infes-
tation of black rat snakes.”87 The deteriorated project was replaced with brick, low-
rise apartments and renamed the Courtyard Apartments, helping to remove “‘the in-
visible barrier’ the projects created.”88  
Nevertheless, a Philadelphia urban planning blog recently noted, “there is still a 
divide between [the Courtyard Apartments residents] and the six-figure income 
households that surround them,”89 and according to another report, “[t]he northern 
border of Courtyard Apartments on Christian Street still feels like a hard boundary, 
with the increasing affluence of Queen Village a world apart.”90 In fact, that invisible 
                                                                                                                
85. Jonathan Tannen, Do Neighborhoods Spread?, ECONSULT SOLUTIONS (June 10, 
2016), http://www.econsultsolutions.com/do-neighborhoods-spread [https://perma.cc/NL7J-
TJ4Q]. 
86. The Courtyard Apartments, which were previously named the Southwark Plaza, are 
recorded by HUD as located at 401 Washington Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19147. LIHTC 
Database Access, HUD, https://lihtc.huduser.gov [https://perma.cc/S2GK-CXTR] (search 
Pennsylvania > Philadelphia). In the 1970s, real estate developers coined the moniker “Queen 
Village” to rebrand the South Philadelphia neighborhood previously known as Southwark. 
Gottlieb, supra note 84. Southwark had been named for the pre-LIHTC Southwark Plaza pub-
lic housing complex, which consisted of three high-rise buildings and some townhomes. Jake 
Blumgart, Queen Villagers Work Toward Neighborhood Integration by Organizing Around 
Kids, PLANPHILLY (Aug. 2, 2016), http://planphilly.com/articles/2016/08/02/queen-villagers-
work-toward-neighborhood-integration-by-organizing-around-kids [https://perma.cc/L9ZL-
X7U2]. At the time, one former resident recalled, “It was all separated . . . Queen Village was 
with Queen Village and they didn’t even consider Southwark Queen Village at that time.” Id.
The neighborhood distinction began to blur, however, when the Southwark project was reha-
bilitated using LIHTC financing. Alan J. Heavens, Town by Town: Queen Village, a 
Neighborhood of Reinvention, PHILA. INQUIRER (Apr. 21, 2013, 3:01 AM), http:// 
www.philly.com/philly/business/real_estate/town-by-town/20130421_Town_By_Town 
___Queen_Village__By_the_Numbers.html [https://perma.cc/A9U6-TTHD]. 
87. Blumgart, supra note 86. 
88. Id.; Heavens, supra note 86. 
89. Blumgart, supra note 86. 
90. Id. The division is particularly striking with respect to the schools. Children in the 
more traditionally affluent part of Queen Village attend William M. Meredith Elementary 
School, where the student body is 63.56% White (roughly on par with the zip code de-
mographics, which reflect a population that is 72.8% White, American FactFinder Community 
Facts, supra note 55 (search 19147 > Population > 2016 American Community Survey > 
Demographic and Housing Estimates > 2014) (reporting that 72.8% of single race households 
was White)) and 18% of students are economically disadvantaged. Meredith William M Sch.,
PA. SCH. PERFORMANCE PROFILE, http://paschoolperformance.org/Profile/6868 [https:// 
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barrier sits on the border of Queen Village and another neighborhood within the zip 
code—Dickinson Narrows—that has five LIHTC properties.
In sum, the spatial distribution of tax-based housing subsidies in Philadelphia 
points to neighborhoods with advantage and disadvantage, wealthy homeowners and 
poor tenants, White schools and Black (or Hispanic) schools. Mapping the flow of 
the mortgage interest deduction benefits and LIHTC properties identifies the neigh-
borhoods that receive tax-based housing subsidies, and a closer look reveals that 
those neighborhoods are as different as the populations that receive the subsidies—
and, often, they are as far apart physically as their residents are socially and econom-
ically.  
The remainder of this Article will explore the relationship between these two tax-
based subsidies and place of residence. The next Part will explain how aspects of the 
mortgage interest deduction and LIHTC program reward the current distribution and 
the economic and racial segregation it reflects. In other words, these spatial distribu-
tions do not merely follow from existing inequality, immobility, and segregation pat-
terns that have arisen from other forces. Rather, the mortgage interest deduction and 
LIHTC programs independently create economic incentives and disincentives that 
may exacerbate these other, nontax problems and present further barriers to integra-
tion.  
III. HOW TAX-BASED HOUSING SUBSIDIES REINFORCE AND REWARD SEGREGATION
A. The Mortgage Interest Deduction Rewards Segregation and Restricts 
Low- and Middle-Income Housing Choice 
We have seen that the spatial distribution of tax-based housing subsidies varies in 
a way that apparently reflects residential segregation patterns. This Part asks whether 
these tax-based housing subsidies have the capacity to exacerbate other forces to help 
reinforce such segregation patterns. The answer, I will argue, is yes. This Part begins 
                                                                                                                
perma.cc/LN9D-9UEA]. A nonprofit organization led by the Philadelphia Schools Partnership 
rated the school a 10 of 10 in an assessment of the school’s academics, attendance, and safety. 
William M. Meredith School, GREAT PHILLY SCHOOLS, http://greatphillyschools.org 
/schools/william-m-meredith-school [https://perma.cc/M836-KN66]. When school budgets 
were cut in the years after the financial crisis, parents at William M. Meredith donated over 
$15,000 in one night to offset the budget cuts at their children’s school. Blumgart, supra note 
86. In contrast, the Courtyard Apartments feed into George W. Nebinger Elementary School, 
which serves a student body that is 44.03% Black, 22.39% Hispanic, 11.69% Asian,only 
9.95% White, and 68% economically disadvantaged. Nebinger George W Sch., PA. SCH.
PERFORMANCE PROFILE, http://paschoolperformance.org/Profile/6880 [https://perma.cc 
/EV6P-5J4M]. The school has been designated by the state as a “low-achieving school” based 
on combined math and reading scores on the Pennsylvania System of School Assessment test. 
See PA. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2015-16 OPPORTUNITY SCHOLARSHIP TAX CREDIT PROGRAM - LIST OF 
LOW ACHIEVING SCHOOLS, http://www.education.pa.gov/Documents/K-12/Opportunity 
%20Scholarship%20Tax%20Credit%20Program/2015-16%20OSTCP%20-%20List%20of% 
20Low%20Achieving%20Schools.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Q7T-XU8F]. And unlike the school 
attended by its students’ wealthy neighbors, the Nebinger school was placed on a list of schools 
considered for closure after the financial crisis. Blumgart, supra note 86. 
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by showing how the mortgage interest deduction may have locational effects that can 
help reinforce and reward de facto segregation of racial and socioeconomic groups.  
The mortgage interest deduction may impact housing choice in at least two ways 
that can harm low-income people. First, when the mortgage interest deduction is not 
fully capitalized, it reduces the cost of moving to higher quality-of-life areas—in-
cluding areas that are disproportionately wealthy and White—for its target demo-
graphic, which is also disproportionately wealthy and White. In this way, the tax law 
may help subsidize the movement of middle- and upper-income White taxpayers 
away from locations with more low-income or minority residents, thereby reinforc-
ing segregation patterns. Second, when the mortgage interest deduction is capital-
ized, it may serve to limit housing choice among lower-income homeowners by driv-
ing up home prices. This section will explain both effects in turn. 
1. The Mortgage Interest Deduction Reduces Wealthy Homebuyers’ Cost of 
Moving to High Quality of Life Areas 
Economists David Albouy and Andrew Hanson have explored the mechanism 
by which the mortgage interest deduction reduces the cost of moving to higher 
quality-of-life areas.91 They argue that an important function of the mortgage in-
terest deduction is to offset costs arising from property taxation and the federal 
income tax that would otherwise create disincentives to move to higher quality-of-
life areas.92 The argument is best understood through examples.  
In the first case, Albouy and Hanson assume that a typical worker earns $10,000 
in location A but would earn $20,000 for performing the same job in location B, 
which has a higher cost of living but similar quality of life.93 The worker will owe 
more dollars in tax in location B than in location A due to the increased earnings. 
If we assume further that the wage rate strongly correlates to the cost of living—
and the worker therefore needs the extra $20,000 to maintain the same standard of 
living in location B—then the income tax increase can be understood as a penalty 
for moving. The tax increase will “dull” the wage incentive to move by rendering 
the worker’s wage bump insufficient to cover the higher cost of living. 94 One so-
lution to this problem would be to index the income tax rate to the cost of living so 
that the worker will not pay additional taxes on the extra $20,000 of earnings, 
thereby eliminating the penalty for moving. Another solution is the approach taken 
in current law: offset the penalty through tax preferences like the mortgage interest 
deduction. 
Now, assume instead that the same worker is considering a move to location C, 
which also has a higher cost of living than location A. This time, assume that the  
                                                                                                                
91. David Albouy & Andrew Hanson, Are Houses Too Big or in the Wrong Place? Tax 
Benefits to Housing and Inefficiencies in Location and Consumption, 28 TAX POL’Y &
ECON. 63 (2014). Albouy and Hanson argue that, in many cases, the mortgage interest 
deduction serves to increase overall efficiency by helping to counteract weaker locational 
disincentives caused by property taxation and the federal income tax. Id.
92. Id. at 66. 
93. Id. at 69. 
94. Id.
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worker’s wages will not rise in location C despite the increase in cost of living. 
The worker might still want to move to location C to take advantage of higher 
quality of life in location C, which might have better schools, prettier landscapes, 
more desirable social circles, greater cultural capital, and so forth. Since the 
worker’s wages are staying constant, he or she would incur no extra tax liability in 
the move; there is no penalty arising from income taxation in this case. The worker 
is free to move to location B in order to take advantage of the higher quality of life 
without any tax-based disincentive. Under this scenario, if the income tax rate were 
indexed for cost of living, then the worker will receive a tax break for moving to 
the higher quality-of-life area that amounts to a bonus.95 Where in the first example 
indexing simply avoided what would otherwise give rise to a tax-based disincen-
tive to move, in this example indexing would actively provide a bonus that func-
tions as a tax-based incentive to move.96  
Although the federal income tax is not indexed, a similar bonus may arise from 
the use of the mortgage interest deduction. People bid up prices for housing at 
every wage level for high quality-of-life areas, so such areas can charge higher 
prices while offering lower wages.97 As a result, higher quality-of-life areas are 
associated with higher home prices, which are in turn associated with higher mort-
gage interest deduction amounts. To maximize the economic benefit that could be 
gained from the mortgage interest deduction, then, a taxpayer should move to a 
higher quality-of-life area with higher home prices. If the taxpayer’s wages stay 
constant in the move, then as seen above, the larger mortgage interest deduction 
will amount to a bonus. That bonus can be understood as a subsidy to help finance 
a move to a higher quality-of-life location. 
Albouy and Hanson use cities as bases for comparison to illustrate their theory. 
They imagine a taxpayer considering a move from Nashville to Miami, for exam-
ple. But a more plausible—and potentially troubling—set of examples can be 
found in cities and their surrounding suburbs. The mortgage interest deduction is 
maximized when city workers choose to live in higher quality-of-life locations 
within commuting distance of their urban jobs. Returning to the Philadelphia case 
study, consider the case of a hypothetical taxpayer who works in center city 
Philadelphia and has a marginal tax rate of 33%.  
The taxpayer would prefer to pay no more than $650 per month for housing 
(exclusive of insurance and property tax). In a world with no mortgage interest 
deduction, the taxpayer might choose to live in the North Philadelphia neighbor-
hoods of Burholme or Fox Chase, within zip code 19111. According to a recent  
                                                                                                                
95. Id. at 70–71. 
96. Stated differently, in the first example, the taxpayer was willing to move if he 
received a $20,000 pay bump, but the income tax lowered that pay bump and made him less 
willing to move. In the second example, the taxpayer was willing to move without any salary 
increase because the new location has a higher quality of life. Since he is induced by the 
quality of life, and not by the salary, there is no reason for the tax system to increase his 
take-home pay; but doing so creates an incentive. 
97. Albouy & Hanson, supra note 91, at 71. 
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survey, the median home value in that area was $174,600 in 2014.98 If the taxpayer 
makes a 20% down payment ($34,920) on a home priced at that median value, then 
he or she would need to secure a mortgage for $139,680.99  
The real estate company Zillow estimates that a $139,680 principal thirty-year 
mortgage at 3.98% interest rate would require the taxpayer to pay approximately 
$665 per month during the first year to begin repaying the mortgage (principal and 
interest).100 Though $665 a month is slightly above this taxpayer’s budget, it is far 
more affordable than homes in the wealthier suburb of Downingtown—featured in 
Part I.C—where houses priced at the median of $218,200 would cost about $831 a 
month in combined interest and principal.101 Without the mortgage interest deduc-
tion, Downingtown would be unaffordable to this taxpayer, who might settle for the 
slightly over-budget Burholme/Fox Chase home within the Philadelphia city limits.  
If the mortgage interest deduction is allowed, however, then the taxpayer could 
anticipate a deduction for approximately $6891 of mortgage interest paid in the 
first year (and additional, lower amounts in subsequent years) if he or she pur-
chases the home in Downingtown.102 Given the taxpayer’s 33% tax rate, he or she 
would receive up to $2274 in value from the mortgage interest deduction. If that 
amount is understood as an offset against the prior year’s housing payments, then 
the monthly payment for a house in Downingtown is now lowered to $642, which 
is within the taxpayer’s budget.103 By lowering the cost of financing a house in 
Downingtown, the tax law creates an incentive to move out of Philadelphia to a 
wealthier suburb that is only ten minutes farther away from the taxpayer’s center 
city office. The table below summarizes this example. 
                                                                                                                
98. American FactFinder Community Facts, supra note 55 (search 19111 > Housing > 
Selected Housing Characteristics > 2014). 
99. Calculations by author. 
100. Mortgage Calculator, ZILLOW, https://www.zillow.com/mortgage-calculator 
[https://perma.cc/C8K3-DD9L]. 
101. American FactFinder Community Facts, supra note 55 (search Downiningtown 
borough, Pennsylvania > Housing > Selected Housing Characteristics > 2014); Mortgage 
Calculator, supra note 100. 
102. To keep the example simple, I have focused on the effects of the mortgage interest 
deduction on costs in the first year. The actual value of the deduction over the course of the 
loan can be difficult for taxpayers to predict due to complex amortization schedules, the 
time value of money, varying marginal tax rates, and uncertainty about how long the house 
will be lived in or owned. Given the uncertainty, as a practical matter, homebuyers are 
unlikely to make purchase decisions based on long-term expectations about the mortgage 
interest deduction value. See Rebecca N. Morrow, Billions of Tax Dollars Spent Inflating 
the Housing Bubble: How and Why the Mortgage Interest Deduction Failed, 17 FORDHAM 
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 751, 783–98 (2012). Nevertheless, as discussed in Parts III and IV, there 
is reason to think the deduction does impact home purchase decisions. The value of the 
mortgage interest deduction in the early years may be especially likely to impact decisions 
since its value during that period is more readily apparent.  
103. The time value of money is ignored for simplicity. 
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A B C D E F G
Location
Median 
Home 
Price*
Principal
Paid in the 
First Year†
Interest 
Paid in 
the First 
Year†
Value of 
Mortgage 
Interest 
Deduction 
(D*33%)
Average 
Monthly 
Payment 
Without 
MID 
[(C+D)/1
2]
Average 
Monthly 
Payment 
With 
MID [F–
(E/12)]
Downingtown $218,200 $3,084 $6,891 $2,274 $831 $642
Burholme/
Fox Chase
$174,600 $2,468 $5,515 $1,820 $665 $513
* Median home prices are based on those reported in the 2010–2014 American 
Community Survey.
† Principal and interest are estimated using a publicly available mortgage amortization 
calculator provided by Zillow. In each case, the dollar amounts assume a 20% down 
payment on a 30-year mortgage with a 3.98% interest rate.
Table 2. 
Therefore, the mortgage interest deduction provides an economic incentive for 
the taxpayer to choose Downingtown over the Burholme/Fox Chase neighborhoods 
within Philadelphia. Specifically, the mortgage interest deduction reduces the price 
of the suburban home in order to make it more affordable to the homebuyer. One 
may be tempted to object that this conclusion assumes that the mortgage interest 
deduction is not fully capitalized into the home prices.104 This is true; however, em-
pirical evidence suggests that the degree of capitalization varies by location, and sub-
urbs generally experience less capitalization than high-density urban areas since 
there is a greater ability to increase supply to meet increased demand in suburban 
locations.105 It is therefore reasonable to assume that the mortgage interest deduction 
does, in fact, reduce the cost of housing in low-density suburbs and lower-density 
parts of urban areas.  
Importantly, a portion of that reduced home price is attributable to a bonus the 
taxpayer received solely on account of choosing Downingtown (where home prices 
                                                                                                                
104. Some or all mortgage interest deduction value may function to raise the purchase 
prices of homes. This may occur if the deduction increases demand in an area that is unable to 
meet that demand with additional supply of housing. The increased demand helps to drive up 
the home prices so that the deduction, when it is finally claimed, merely offsets that added 
cost. See Morrow, supra note 102, at 768 n.60. If the mortgage interest deduction is built into 
home prices, then the home prices themselves would be lower in a world without the mortgage 
interest deduction—and if that price were low enough, then the taxpayer might be able to 
afford to buy in Downingtown in the no-deduction world after all. 
105. Id. at 798. In many cities, land-use regulations restrict the location, size, or height of 
housing, thereby limiting supply. SANDFORD IKEDA & EMILY WASHINGTON, MERCATUS CTR.,
HOW LAND-USE REGULATION UNDERMINES AFFORDABLE HOUSING (2015), https://
www.mercatus.org/system/files/Ikeda-Land-Use-Regulation.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2DN-
BJEP]. 
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are higher due to higher quality of life) over Burholme/Fox Chase. If the taxpayer 
moves to Downingtown, then he or she will receive $2274 in value from the mort-
gage interest deduction in the first year, as compared to the $1820 the taxpayer would 
receive in Burlholme/Fox Chase. Assume that the taxpayer’s wage earnings have 
remained unchanged because, like many commuters, he or she will continue to work 
in center city Philadelphia regardless of place of residence. The taxpayer’s gross in-
come remains constant, but the taxpayer will save $454 in taxes simply by moving 
to Downingtown. That extra $454 attributable to the increased deduction size is a 
bonus for choosing Downingtown.  
Stated differently, the taxpayer received a home price reduction that was $454 
more than it would have been otherwise. On these facts, our taxpayer saved approx-
imately $38 a month due to the bonus portion. That $38 was the difference between 
a $642 per month mortgage payment that was within the taxpayer’s $650 budget, 
versus a $680 per month mortgage payment that may well be deemed unaffordable. 
This analysis is summarized in the table below. 
A B C D E F
Location
Value of 
Mortgage 
Interest 
Deduction
Bonus 
Portion
Average 
Monthly 
Payment 
Without 
MID
Average 
Monthly 
Payment 
with MID 
(Including 
Bonus)
Average 
Monthly 
Payment 
with MID 
(Excluding 
Bonus)
Downingtown
$2,274
(~$189.5/mo)
$454
(~$38/mo)
$831 $642 $680
Burholme/
Fox Chase
$1,820
(~$152/mo)
--- $665 $513 $513
Table 3.  
It makes no difference to the analysis that, in choosing Downingtown over 
Burholme/Fox Chase, our taxpayer chose to pay $129 per month more for housing—
an amount that eclipses the size of the bonus. The fact remains that, in our hypothet-
ical, the mortgage interest deduction successfully reduced the housing prices in 
Downingtown to a level affordable to the taxpayer. And one of the reasons that it 
achieved that goal was by providing the taxpayer with a $38 bonus to be used toward 
mortgage financing instead of tax payments.  
In conclusion, the mortgage interest deduction not only enhances the homebuyer’s 
housing choice by expanding the range of affordable options, but it also rewards the 
choice to move to higher-cost areas with higher quality of life. This analysis has 
important implications for the problem of urban segregation. Tax professor Dorothy 
Brown has noted that “[m]iddle- and upper-income taxpayers who are overwhelm-
ingly white benefit the most from federal tax subsidies for housing.”106 It is that 
wealthy, White demographic that is most likely to benefit from increased purchasing 
power in wealthy suburban housing markets or other high quality of life areas. In the 
                                                                                                                
106. Brown, supra note 14, at 333. 
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metropolitan context, “higher quality of life” often correlates with richer, whiter 
communities that may or may not be located in the suburbs. Even small economic 
incentives in support of White flight and racial or economic segregation should be 
disfavored given the growing concerns about economic and racial inequality in 
America.  
2. Capitalization of the Mortgage Interest Deduction Reduces Affordable Housing 
Options for Lower-Income Homebuyers 
In addition to expanding housing options for claimants of the mortgage interest 
deduction, the tax preference may limit housing choice for those who do not. The 
reason lies in the effect of capitalization. Capitalization occurs when an area is unable 
to meet increased demand caused by the tax incentive.107 In such areas, the high de-
mand drives up home prices across the board for all potential homeowners—whether 
or not those homeowners can claim the mortgage interest deduction. Since many 
middle-class homeowners do not itemize their tax returns, and few if any low-income 
taxpayers itemize, both populations may be subject to higher home prices without 
the ability to offset the price with the mortgage interest deduction.108 This problem 
may be especially pronounced in high-density urban areas that cannot readily in-
crease housing supply.109
Artificially inflated home prices may present a barrier to entry for middle- and 
lower-income homebuyers.110 They may also force some to choose neighborhoods 
with lower quality of life or less economic and racial diversity than they may be able 
to afford in a world without inflated home prices. In other words, to the extent that 
the mortgage interest deduction is capitalized into home prices, it may function to 
limit housing choice for persons who are not able to use the deduction. This harm 
reaches well beyond the low-income tenant population that is the primary focus of 
this Article, and it may further exacerbate the other problems discussed here. 
Whether the mortgage interest deduction is fully capitalized or not, therefore, it 
may harm low-income persons and minorities. First, if the mortgage interest deduc-
tion is not fully capitalized—as is often true of low-density suburban areas—it can 
help lower the price of housing for homebuyers who rely on mortgages as described 
above. As a result, it may increase housing choice for a wealthy, White population 
in a manner that rewards White flight and racial and socioeconomic segregation. 
Second, in areas where the mortgage interest deduction is capitalized into home 
prices, it may restrict housing choice for middle- and lower-income persons, includ-
ing many minorities, by driving up home prices and leaving them with fewer afford-
able options for location of residence. These potential harms may compound other 
                                                                                                                
107. See Morrow, supra note 102, at 768 n.60.
108. Even if low- or middle-income taxpayers were to itemize, the benefit they receive 
from the deduction will be lower than what is received by a higher income taxpayer. The 
reason is not only because their marginal tax rate is lower but also because the itemized de-
ductions may only slightly exceed the standard deduction. As a result, their itemized deduc-
tions (including the mortgage interest deduction) would lower their taxes only slightly more 
than what would be achieved with the standard deduction alone. 
109. Morrow, supra note 102, at 768 n.60. 
110. Brown, supra note 14, at 337; Morrow, supra note 102, at 798. 
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problems that arise from LIHTC program design and administration, as described in 
the next subpart. 
B. The LIHTC Program Rewards Segregation and Restricts Low-Income Tenants’
Rental Options 
Having demonstrated how the mortgage interest deduction rewards segregation 
and limits the affordable housing options available to low- and middle-income 
homebuyers, this Part now turns to the ways that the LIHTC program rewards 
segregation and restricts low-income tenants’ rental options. The LIHTC program 
rewards segregation through a combination of federal law and state administrative 
procedures that make the credit most available to developers who locate projects 
in high-poverty, often-segregated areas. A serious consequence is that the LIHTC 
program has the tendency to limit housing choice for low-income tenants in at least 
two ways. First, because these policies lead to a spatial distribution of LIHTC 
properties that is often limited to high-poverty, inner-city locations, many low-
income tenants who wish to benefit from the tax law may be restricted to those 
locations.  
Second, the LIHTC program may limit the effectiveness of tenant voucher pro-
grams that rely, at least in part, on LIHTC properties to support the program. 
Landlords of LIHTC properties are required by law to accept tenant vouchers; how-
ever, if the goal of tenant vouchers is to expand low-income tenants’ housing 
choices, then that goal may be partially undermined by the LIHTC program since 
the spatial distribution of LIHTC properties leaves them few options. This section 
will consider these problems and the nature of recent reforms intended to correct 
them. 
1. Federal Tax Law and State Administrative Procedures Reward Development of 
LIHTC Properties in Segregated Neighborhoods 
Federal law requires states to adopt a qualified allocation plan that sets forth 
prioritization criteria for awarding LIHTC credits to developer applicants. There 
are two reasons why projects located in economically and racially segregated areas 
may be more likely than others to receive LIHTC allocations under these plans. 
First, states are required by statute to weigh location among the prioritization 
criteria set forth in a qualified allocation plans,111 but the law does not detail how 
location should be weighed.112 Many states give priority to projects located in very 
low-income areas perceived as having a greater affordable housing need.113  
Second, federal law provides for higher credit amounts for projects located in 
certain areas, and some researchers have observed that developers are more likely 
to apply for LIHTC allocations for projects located in those areas, increasing the 
                                                                                                                
111. I.R.C. § 42(m)(1)(C) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-40). 
112. As a result, the same location criteria may be weighed differently by different states. 
See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., EFFECT OF QAP INCENTIVES ON THE LOCATION OF 
LIHTC PROPERTIES 1 (2015), https://www.novoco.com/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pdr_qap
_incentive_location_lihtc_properties_050615.pdf [https://perma.cc/KP2F-5VQG].
113. Id. at 2–3.
2018] TAX LAW REWARDS HOUSING SEGREGATION 949
likelihood that such projects will receive allocations.114 The size of the LIHTC is 
always calculated by multiplying an eligible portion of a project’s basis by an 
applicable percentage set forth in the statute;115 however, the eligible basis on which 
the credit is calculated is increased to 130% when a project is located in a statutorily 
defined qualified census tract or a difficult development area.116 These rules, which 
are commonly referred to as the qualified census tract or difficult development area 
basis boost provisions, make projects built in very low-income or high-poverty areas 
eligible for an LIHTC up to 30% larger than comparable projects built in higher-
income or lower-poverty areas.117 Several researchers have attributed clustering of 
LIHTC properties in low-income areas to these basis boost provisions.118
In conclusion, to the extent that the tax law and state administrative procedures 
make it more likely that the tax credits will be allocated to properties in economically 
                                                                                                                
114. Id. at 3. As discussed below, these provisions have been blamed for promoting 
allocations of tax credits that have a harmful disparate impact on racial minorities. Between 
their prioritization methods and their handling of the credit boosts, several states have drawn 
criticism and have been named in legal complaints related to the allocation of LIHTCs. Since 
2008, federal law has given states greater flexibility in administering the tax credits, and 
several states have adjusted their qualified allocation plans to help minimize the disparate 
impact on minorities. See infra Part V. As such, there is considerable variation across states in 
the administration and impact of the LIHTC program, and many state policies are relatively 
new and untested. 
115. I.R.C. § 42(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-40). For new buildings that are not 
otherwise receiving federal subsidies, the size of the LIHTC is set to equal seventy percent of 
the “qualified basis” over the ten-year period when the credit is available. I.R.C. § 42(a), 
(b)(1)–(2) (explaining that the size of the credit for any given year is determined by 
multiplying the adjusted basis of the eligible building by an “applicable percentage,” where 
the applicable percentage is defined as the percentage “which will yield over a 10-year period 
amounts of credit . . . which have a present value equal to . . . 70 percent of the qualified basis 
of a new building which is not federally subsidized for the taxable year”, and the credit for 
non-federally subsidized new buildings equals at least nine percent of the qualified basis of 
each qualified low-income building.). The qualified basis is determined by multiplying the 
“eligible basis” by the smaller of (i) the percentage of total units dedicated to low-income 
units, or (ii) the percentage of total floor space dedicated to low-income units. As a baseline 
rule, the “eligible basis” of a new building is its adjusted basis at the close of the first taxable 
year of the credit period; however, the eligible basis is increased in the case of qualified census 
tracts or difficult development areas. I.R.C. § 42(c). 
116. I.R.C. § 42(d)(5)(B). Under current law, a tract is deemed a qualified census tract if
“50 percent or more of the households have an income which is less than 60 percent of the
area median gross income for such year or which has a poverty rate of at least 25 percent.”
I.R.C. § 42(d)(5)(B)(ii)(I). The initial criteria for designating qualified census tracts was en-
tirely income based, but an alternative poverty-rate criteria was added by the Community
Renewal Tax Relief Act in 2000. In contrast, difficult development areas are specifically des-
ignated by HUD as areas where the costs of construction, land, and utilities are high relative
to area median gross income. I.R.C. § 42(d)(5)(B)(iii)(I).
117. I.R.C. § 42(d)(5)(B)(i). 
118. Nathaniel Baum-Snow & Justin Marion, The Effects of Low Income Housing Tax
Credit Developments on Neighborhoods, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 654, 655 (2009); Dawkins, supra
note 26, at 231. 
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and racially segregated areas than in other areas, the LIHTC program rewards segre-
gation. This, alone, would be reason to consider reform. But these policies also harm 
low-income tenants in a second way: by limiting the effectiveness of nontax programs 
intended to promote housing choice. This problem is taken up in the next subpart.  
2. The LIHTC Program Limits Low-Income Tenants’ Housing Choice
Because the total amount of LIHTCs each state can allocate is capped,119 projects 
developed in high-poverty areas may come at the exclusion of projects built in lower-
poverty areas. By disproportionately siting affordable housing in high-poverty areas, 
and especially in inner cities, the LIHTC program may have the dual effects of steer-
ing low-income residents to those neighborhoods and limiting their housing options 
elsewhere, thereby restricting their ability to leave.120 It may also limit the effective-
ness of a major nontax alternative to the project-based LIHTC program: the Section 
8 tenant voucher program (or the “Housing Choice Voucher program”), which is 
specifically designed to improve residential mobility of low-income tenants.  
The Housing Choice Voucher program, which provides a tenant-side subsidy to 
low-income tenants for use toward housing, is the largest subsidy for affordable 
housing.121 The goals of the program have been described as to promote “better hous-
ing quality, more geographic mobility, and increased self-sufficiency for very low-
income renters, in addition to alleviating their housing affordability problems.”122
The efficacy of that program has been questioned, however, by those who have ob-
served that voucher users often do not move at all, let alone to areas with lower pov-
erty.123  
When low-income residents in Florida were displaced from properties retired 
from subsidized housing inventories, the majority of residents relocated to neighbor-
hoods with similar characteristics as their original neighborhoods.124 This outcome 
                                                                                                                
119. Each state is generally limited to the greater of $1.75 per resident or $2,000,000. 
I.R.C. § 42(h)(3)(C)(ii). In addition, an antitax shelter restriction placed on the credit was a 
$25,000 per taxpayer limit on use of passive losses. Advocates worried that the limit “would 
severely restrict the credit’s marketability to the traditional consumers of tax preferences
—wealthy earners seeking to lower their liabilities.” Zigas, supra note 21, at 50.
120. See Ellen et al., supra note 41, at 233 (“Through encouraging large-scale public hous-
ing developments that almost exclusively house very-low-income tenants and allowing these 
developments to be sited almost exclusively in very-low-income neighborhoods, federal hous-
ing policy generally has steered subsidized tenants to extremely low-income and high-poverty 
communities.”).
121. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL HOUSING ASSISTANCE FOR LOW-INCOME 
HOUSEHOLDS 2 (2015), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016 
/reports/50782-LowIncomeHousing-OneColumn.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4TG-N9UE]. 
122. Judith D. Feins & Rhiannon Patterson, Geographic Mobility in the Housing Choice 
Voucher Program: A Study of Families Entering the Program, 1995–2002, 8 CITYSCAPE: J.
POL’Y DEV. & RES. 21, 21 (2005). 
123. See id.
124. Dawn E. Jourdan, Anne L. Ray, Elizabeth A. Thompson & Kristen Dikeman, 
Relocating from Subsidized Housing in Florida: Are Residents Moving to Opportunity?, 22 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 155 (2014). 
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was consistent with prior literature, which suggested that without significant inter-
vention and counseling about how to use tenant vouchers, most voucher holders do 
not move to better neighborhoods.125 For example, most voucher users live in 
neighborhoods with schools comparable to those accessible to households with 
similar low incomes.126
But these facts should not be understood as evidence that low-income tenants 
do not value neighborhood choice. Rather, there are indications that at least some 
low-income tenants would choose to move to higher quality neighborhoods if their 
circumstances permit. One study of the Housing Choice Voucher program found 
that “[t]here was a small but consistent tendency for families [that moved more 
than once] to choose slightly better neighborhoods.”127 In addition, there is evi-
dence that voucher holders do move to neighborhoods with higher performing 
schools when their children reach school age if such options are available.128
Unfortunately, many tenants “in metropolitan areas where housing options are 
more constrained (either through segregation in the housing market or through 
availability of housing) voucher households end up near lower performing 
schools.”129  
Among the structural problems that may limit the efficacy of the Housing 
Choice Voucher program is the administration of the LIHTC program. A recent 
case has highlighted these consequences of current LIHTC policy. The case Texas 
Dep’t. of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. ,
which was filed in the Northern District of Texas in 2008130 and subsequently 
worked its way to the Supreme Court in 2015,131 arose from a complaint by a 
Dallas-based fair housing and civil rights organization called the Inclusive 
Communities Project (ICP).132 One of the services provided by ICP was to assist 
low-income families with Section 8 vouchers “in finding housing opportunities in 
the suburban communities in the Dallas area.”133 This assistance included efforts 
to place such families in LIHTC properties because those landlords cannot refuse 
to accept the tenant vouchers.  
By the state’s own admission, its LIHTC properties had been disproportionately 
sited in high-poverty, mostly minority, inner-city communities, and far fewer af-
fordable housing projects were located in higher-income suburbs.134 As a result, 
                                                                                                                
125. Id.
126. Keren Mertens Horn, Ingrid Gould Ellen & Amy Ellen Schwartz, Do Housing Choice 
Voucher Holders Live Near Good Schools?, 23 J. HOUSING ECON. 28, 35 (2014). 
127. Feins & Patterson, supra note 122, at 41. 
128. Ingrid Gould Ellen, Keren Mertens Horn & Amy Ellen Schwartz, Why Don’t Housing 
Choice Voucher Recipients Live Near Better Schools? Insights from Big Data, 35 J. POL’Y
ANAL. & MGMT. 884, 886 (2016). 
129. Horn et al., supra note 126, at 38. 
130. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 860 F. Supp. 
2d 312 (N.D. Tex. 2012).
131. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507 
(2015). 
132. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 314.
133. Complaint at 2–3, Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 860 F. Supp. 2d 312 (No. 3:08-cv-00546).
134. Id. at 1–2.
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ICP alleged that the “disproportionate allocation of housing tax credits to low in-
come minority areas directly interferes with ICP’s ability to find housing for its 
clients in the higher opportunity, predominantly White areas of the Dallas metro-
politan area.”135 ICP sued, alleging that the Texas housing authority had allocated 
LIHTCs in a manner that reinforced historic segregation patterns.136
Texas is not the only state that has faced such accusations. Housing authorities 
in two northeastern states, New Jersey and Connecticut, have been subject to sim-
ilar lawsuits.137 The central complaint in all three lawsuits has been the same: state 
housing authorities administer the LIHTC in a manner that leaves low-income mi-
norities few affordable housing options outside the inner city. None of these law-
suits have been successful.138 But it is not necessary to prove legal liability to es-
tablish that the LIHTC program in these and many other cities has rewarded 
segregation and limited housing choice. In this way, the LIHTC program may com-
pound nontax problems that limit housing options for low-income persons, such as 
zoning restrictions and residential patterns born from discriminatory, pre-Civil 
Rights era housing policies like redlining.139
Meanwhile, as explained above, the mortgage interest deduction has worked to 
exacerbate this harm by limiting housing options for low- and middle-income and 
minority homebuyers (when the deduction is capitalized) and by providing eco-
nomic incentives for wealthier, predominantly White homebuyers to move out of 
inner cities (when the deduction is not capitalized). Together, these two tax laws 
may interact to reinforce and reward economic and racial segregation, suggesting 
the need for reform. The next Part will take a step back to ask what we stand to 
lose from reforming these tax programs, beginning with the LIHTC and then look-
ing at the mortgage interest deduction. In both cases, I will argue that any benefits 
from the current spatial distribution are too uncertain to justify the potential harms. 
                                                                                                                
135. Id. at 3. 
136. See id.
137. E.g., Asylum Hill Problem Solving Revitalization Ass’n v. King, 890 A.2d 522 
(Conn. 2006); In re Adoption of the 2003 Low Income Hous. Tax Credit Qualified Allocation 
Plan, 848 A.2d 1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004); see also Robert Neuwirth, Renovation or 
Ruin, SHELTERFORCE (Sept. 1, 2004), http://www.shelterforce.org/2004/09/01/renovation-or-
ruin [https://perma.cc/5N7A-8GAB]. 
138. See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 321 (holding that the plaintiff failed 
to prove a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that a challenged practice caused a 
discriminatory effect); King, 890 A.2d at 540 (dismissing the claim for lack of standing); In re 
Adoption of the 2003 LIHTC Qualified Allocation Plan, 848 A.2d at 6 (holding that the New 
Jersey Housing Mortgage Finance Agency did not violate federal or state law). 
139. David Albouy & Bert Lue, Driving to Opportunity: Local Rents, Wages, Commuting, 
and Sub-Metropolitan Quality of Life, 89 J. URBAN ECON. 74, 78 (2015) (“As another example, 
consider the impact of zoning restrictions meant to exclude low-income households. If such 
zoning is binding, low-income households will have a limited supply of neighborhoods to 
choose from, say in the central city.”); see also IKEDA & WASHINGTON, supra note 105. 
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IV. EVALUATING THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF TAX-BASED HOUSING SUBSIDIES:
WEIGHING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REFORM
A. The LIHTC Program’s Effects on Supply and Externalities Are Uncertain 
Part III argued that both the mortgage interest deduction and the LIHTC function 
to reinforce and reward racial and economic segregation while also limiting housing 
choice for low- and middle- income earners. But these facts alone may be insufficient 
to conclude that the LIHTC program should be reformed. First, we need to under-
stand what we would be giving up by reforming these programs. If the current spatial 
distributions are essential to advance the programs’ purposes, then any reform pro-
posals must take that into account. This section will begin this stage of the analysis 
by asking whether the purposes of the LIHTC program necessitate the current distri-
bution.  
The LIHTC is most traditionally understood as a subsidy used to increase the sup-
ply of affordable rental housing.140 For this purpose, the LIHTC works when it lowers 
the production costs associated with new construction or rehabilitation of rent-con-
trolled rental housing enough to make the project profitable, thereby encouraging 
developers to invest in affordable housing they would not have otherwise pro-
duced.141 However, the basis boost for qualified census tracts and difficult develop-
ment areas discussed in Part III.B points to a second goal beyond the primary goal 
of increasing investment in affordable housing: the LIHTC aims to attract investment 
in affordable housing specifically to neighborhoods most affected by poverty for the 
purpose of producing positive externalities. This section will argue that the LIHTC 
program’s success with respect to both of these goals is uncertain. 
1. The LIHTC Program Suffers from High Crowd-Out Rates 
The primary goal of the LIHTC is to increase the supply of affordable rental hous-
ing, but the program’s efficacy has been questioned. In order for the LIHTC to in-
crease the supply of housing, it must provide a housing unit to a family that would 
not have purchased housing in the private market.142 If the same family would have 
                                                                                                                
140. See Leviner, supra note 12, at 869. A building is generally eligible for the credit if it 
is part of a qualified low-income housing project during the compliance period. I.R.C.  
§ 42(c)(2) (West 2011 & Supp. 2017). A qualified low-income housing project is defined by 
reference to the income of the tenants. Specifically, the project must be for residential rental 
housing that meets one of two tests: the 20-50 test or the 40-60 test. I.R.C. § 42(g)(1). A project 
satisfies the 20-50 test if twenty percent or more of the residential units are both rent-restricted 
and occupied by individuals whose income is fifty percent less than the area median gross 
income (AMGI). Id. Alternatively, the 40-60 test is satisfied if forty percent or more of the 
residential units are both rent-restricted and occupied by individuals whose income is sixty 
percent or less of AMGI. Id. A qualified low-income housing building that is part of a project 
that meets one of these two income-based tests is eligible to receive the LIHTC and will re-
ceive the credit for up to ten years if the state housing agency chooses to allocate credits to 
that project pursuant to its qualified allocation plan. 
141. Leviner, supra note 12, at 870. 
142. Todd Sinai & Joel Waldfogel, Do Low-Income Housing Subsidies Increase the 
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purchased a unit in the private market, then the subsidy will reduce demand in the 
private market, and that reduced demand for private housing would cause a reduction 
in the number of private units.143 Any reduction in private units would offset the new 
subsidized housing units.144 This is referred to in the literature as the “crowd-out” 
effect. The result of crowd-out is a failure to raise the total number of units in the 
housing stock.145
Though the empirical evidence is mixed, some researchers have found that the 
LIHTC program “substitutes one-for-one for the provision of private sector housing 
units.”146 Another study found that “displacement of private rental housing construc-
tion as a result of LIHTC program is substantial,” and “nearly all LIHTC develop-
ment is offset by crowd-out of unsubsidized rental housing construction.”147
                                                                                                                
Occupied Housing Stock?, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 2137, 2143 (2005); see also Leviner, supra note 
12, at 870, 877 (noting that the LIHTC is “generally considered a success” but arguing that 
“[t]aking into account the effects of the LIHTC in displacing some unsubsidized units, the net 
increase in rental units in the affordable housing supply is expected to be less than the esti-
mated number of total units produced by the LIHTC”).
143. See Sinai & Waldfogel, supra note 142, at 2142.  
144. See id.  
145. Id.  
146. Stephen Malpezzi & Kerry Vandell, Does the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit 
Increase the Supply of Housing?, 11 J. HOUSING ECON. 360, 369 (2002). An earlier study 
by business and real estate scholars Todd Sinai and Joel Waldfogel asked whether 
affordable housing subsidies increase the number of families housed in their own units, or 
whether they only displace privately provided affordable housing. Sinai & Waldfogel, supra
note 142, at 2138; Michael D. Eriksen & Stuart S. Rosenthal, Crowd Out Effects of Place-
Based Subsidized Rental Housing: New Evidence from the LIHTC Program, 94 J. PUB.
ECON. 953, 954, 957 (2010) (explaining the limitations of the Sinai and Waldfogel study). 
Their study, which focused on the impact of programs that predated the LIHTC program, 
evaluated the effects of both project-based housing subsidies and tenant-side housing 
subsidies like tenant vouchers. Sinai and Waldfogel found that housing subsidies do raise 
the total number of units, but on average, three subsidized units displace two units that 
would otherwise have been provided by the private market. Sinai and Waldfogel, supra note 
142, at 2162. In addition, they concluded that project-based housing subsidies displace more 
private units than tenant vouchers. Id. at 2154. Nevertheless, Sinai and Waldfogel had 
optimistically concluded that project-based subsidies do increase the housing stock despite 
some displacement of private market units. 
147. Eriksen & Rosenthal, supra note 146, at 964. To explain their results, Eriksen and 
Rosenthal hypothesized that the results related to the specific population targeted by the 
LIHTC. Specifically, they argued that the LIHTC actually targets moderate- (as opposed to 
low-) income tenants who would have otherwise contributed to the market share for 
unsubsidized housing. Id. at 954. They point to two programmatic features as proof that the 
LIHTC targets moderate income persons. Id. First, the rent ceilings on the subsidized units 
typically result in rents between the 40th and 50th percentile of private market rents. Id.
These rates are relatively high and “unaffordable for many low-income families.” Id.
Second, the eligibility criteria itself is set at 60% of area median income, which is “well 
above income limits that govern eligibility for occupants of traditional public housing 
developments.” Id. Traditional public housing developments set the eligibility cut off at 
30% of area median income. At least one study, published in 1995, found that only 28% of 
LIHTC residents had income below 50% of AMGI (HUD’s threshold for identifying “very 
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Moreover, some researchers have observed that crowd-out occurs at a higher rate in 
neighborhoods that are gentrifying, suggesting that the private-market is more likely 
to produce unsubsidized affordable housing in such areas.148  
Developers do often site projects in neighborhoods that subsequently gentrify.149
A recent study of Philadelphia found that 33.2% of LIHTC properties in the city that 
entered service between 1990 and 2000 were in census tracts that subsequently gen-
trified.150 To the extent that LIHTC properties are sited in gentrifying areas that ex-
perience higher than average crowd-out rates, the efficacy of the LIHTC to increase 
the supply of affordable housing is further undermined. These studies cast serious 
doubt on how well the LIHTC advances its primary goal of increasing the supply of 
affordable housing. 
2. Social Costs Outweigh Gains in Property Value 
The second goal of the LIHTC program is to produce positive externalities in 
areas of concentrated disadvantage through place-based investment.151 High-poverty 
areas are plagued by a long list of social and economic disadvantages, including but 
not limited to: lower political influence, lower-quality public services and schools, a 
weak economic base, ineffective policing, gang activity and other crime, violence, 
teenage childbearing, high dropout rates, poor community health, joblessness, home-
lessness, and blight.152 Proponents of place-based investment programs believe that 
                                                                                                                
low-income families”), as compared to 81% of residents of the traditional public housing 
developments that predated the LIHTC. Id. at 955. However, this finding is at odds with a 
more recent HUD report on LIHTC tenants. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., DATA ON 
TENANTS IN LIHTC UNITS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2013 (2016), https://www.huduser.gov 
/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/LIHTC-Tenants-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/QX3Z-PFY4]. 
The HUD report estimated that about half of LIHTC units are occupied by tenants who earn 
thirty percent or less of the area median gross income, despite the fact that the tax rules only 
require rents to be set based on incomes at fifty or sixty percent of AMGI. Id. at 19–20. This 
means that many LIHTC tenants may be required to pay well over thirty percent of their 
income in rent. All other housing assistance programs cap the amount of rent for which a 
tenant is responsible at thirty percent of the tenant’s actual income. The LIHTC has no such 
restriction, as the rent limits are based off of AMGI instead of tenants’ individual income 
levels. In fact, over half of the roughly 45% of tenants who earn 30% or less AMGI pay 
about 55% of their income in rent. Id. Other housing assistance programs can be used to 
help fill the gap. 
148. Baum-Snow & Marion, supra note 118, at 665. 
149. Id. at 657 (noting that “whether locating in a qualified tract or not, developers will 
still find it to their advantage to locate in gentrifying areas”). 
150. Field, supra note 48, at 21.  
151. SHARKEY, supra note 1, at 172. The investment approach contrasts to what Sharkey 
calls the “mobility approach,” which aims to decrease concentrations of disadvantage by 
moving people away from areas with concentrated poverty. Sharkey favors a combination 
approach that emphasizes investment in low-income areas and also incorporates targeted 
mobility programs. For example, Sharkey supports the demolition and reduced investment 
in high-rise style low income housing, which he would replace with mixed-income housing 
options to be used by individuals identified as most likely to benefit from relocation. 
152. Id. at 179. 
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government investment can help reduce these problems and will have a positive eco-
nomic impact on such communities.153 One housing advocate has argued at an NYU 
Law School forum that the LIHTC promotes services and community benefits 
through its place-based housing program154:  
[W]e shouldn’t overlook the fact that the housing credit has an anti-pov-
erty impact that goes well beyond the number of apartments built. The 
credit spurs considerable economic development that engages the private 
market in places long starved for capital. It lays the groundwork for new 
businesses, health centers, schools, parks, and jobs. Because of this broad 
reach, a dollar of LIHTC capital typically has a much greater impact in 
low-income areas than it does in other places. It isn’t just residents of 
these projects that benefit—so, too, do nearby neighbors and business 
owners in low-income areas.155
This observation is an anecdotal account of the external benefits experienced by 
communities when LIHTC properties are in low-income areas. Though this view 
does have some support in the empirical literature, the empirical work in this area 
has focused almost entirely on the effect of LIHTC properties on surrounding prop-
erty values.156  
For example, one group of researchers looked at the extent to which positive ex-
ternalities were generated by place-based housing investments in New York City.157
They found that the magnitude of external benefits from place-based housing invest-
ment was “substantial” overall but observed that positive externalities were greatest 
“in the more distressed neighborhoods.”158 The primary benefit observed was the 
                                                                                                                
153. Id. (attributing these social problems to “decades of shortsighted policies, 
intentional efforts to isolate or exclude minority communities within cities, and major 
demographic shifts” and arguing that there is “good reason to believe that if the pattern of 
disinvestment in urban neighborhoods were mitigated or reversed, some level of economic 
and racial integration would follow”). In adopting the place-based investment approach, 
Sharkey has emphasized investment in services for adults (e.g., job assistance) and children 
(e.g., quality child care and early childhood education programs), and he has deemphasized
the role of large housing projects as beneficial for this purpose. Id. at 184–94. Sharkey 
generally opposes affordable housing strategies that constrain families from leaving high-
poverty areas. Id. at 174. 
154. Denise Scott, Building More than Housing, NYU FURMAN CTR.: THE DREAM 
REVISITED (June 2015), http://furmancenter.org/research/iri/essay/building-more-than-
housing [https://perma.cc/PUB9-NRHJ]. 
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Baum-Snow & Marion, supra note 118; Amy Ellen Schwartz, Ingrid 
Gould Ellen, Ioan Voicu & Michael H. Schill, The External Effects of Place-Based 
Subsidized Housing, 36 REGIONAL SCI. URB. ECON. 679 (2006). Schwartz et al. noted, 
however, that “[u]ntil recently, empirical research has failed to provide persuasive evidence 
that investments in affordable housing can generate positive spillover effects.” Schwartz et 
al., supra, at 683. 
157. Schwartz et al., supra note 156. 
158. Id. at 703. Schwartz et al. attributed the positive externalities to the mitigation of 
negative externalities associated with inadequate housing. Id. In this respect, the mechanism 
by which affordable housing produces positive externalities is similar to how renewable 
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“increase[] in property values in the vicinity of the investment.”159 These findings 
were consistent with those subsequently observed in the LIHTC context.160 For ex-
ample, the creation of LIHTC-financed units in a neighborhood is sometimes asso-
ciated with an increase in surrounding home prices.161  
This effect is most likely to take place in very low-value areas (as opposed to 
gentrifying or high-value areas).162 For example, constructing a new LIHTC project 
in higher income areas like the Fox Chase/Burlholme neighborhood in Philadelphia 
probably will not provide a boost to the neighborhood, but constructing that same 
project in a poor neighborhood like Mantua might produce some positive external 
value. In other words, targeting housing investments to high-poverty areas may in 
fact produce economic benefits that improve those neighborhoods.  
These studies have two important implications. First, they cast doubt on any op-
timism over the fact that some cities, like Philadelphia, seem to have a large number 
of LIHTC properties in gentrifying areas. It is tempting to view this fact as a posi-
tive—even a sign that the LIHTC program is working. But this Article had already 
set forth two reasons why such optimism may be misplaced. First, as noted in Part 
II, gentrification often does not lead to integration, even in cases when the low-in-
come tenants can continue to live in their rental units. Second, Part IV.A.1 explained 
that the rate of crowd-out may be highest in gentrifying areas, suggesting that the 
LIHTC program is not needed to produce comparable rental housing in those areas. 
And now there is a third reason to be skeptical: there are fewer positive externalities 
associated with LIHTC properties located in gentrifying areas.  
Second, these studies suggest that the greatest gains—in both externalities and 
supply—can be achieved not only by continuing to target poor areas but also by tar-
geting nongentrifying poor areas even more closely than they are targeted under cur-
rent law. However, this conclusion should be questioned. The studies that have pro-
vided the strongest empirical support for this type of place-based investment 
strategy—studies that measure positive effects on surrounding property values 
—have limited their focus on the neighborhood rather than the low-income tenants 
                                                                                                                
energy theoretically produces positive externalities. See Layser, supra note 19, at 465–67
(explaining that wind energy produces positive externalities by displacing emission-
producing fossil fuel sources to mitigate the effects of negative externalities associated with 
traditional energy). 
159. Schwartz et al., supra note 156, at 703. 
160. See generally Rebecca Diamond & Tim McQuade, Who Wants Affordable Housing 
in Their Backyard? An Equilibrium Analysis of Low Income Property Development 1 (Dec. 
2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://web.stanford.edu/~diamondr/LIHTC_spillovers.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GP86-YNCC]. 
161. Diamond & McQuade, supra note 160, at 15; see also FREEMAN, supra note 26, at 8–
9; Baum-Snow & Marion, supra note 118, at 663;. 
162. Baum-Snow & Marion, supra note 118, at 664 (explaining that the “effect of LIHTC 
units may be a function of neighborhood trajectory,” where nongentrifying low-income neigh-
borhoods have some economic gains due to LIHTC properties and on the other hand, gentri-
fying neighborhoods experienced some economic loss). Baum-Snow and Marion also ob-
served some increased property values in gentrifying areas, but they hypothesized that those 
increases may reflect expected future values of the property once the units become market-
rate housing—not the affordable housing units itself. Id.
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themselves.163 Relatedly, a significant body of literature suggests that low-income  
tenants benefit most when their housing options are not restricted to high-poverty 
locations.164 In short, the social costs associated with restricted housing choice and 
segregated communities are very high. 
For those who are more concerned about humanitarian crises than property values, 
the argument that the LIHTC should target even more projects to very-low income 
areas to maximize home values (or to minimize adverse effects on home values) is 
unpersuasive. This is especially true if the LIHTC program not only targets very-low 
income neighborhoods, but also helps to keep those neighborhoods segregated as I 
have argued. In sum, the benefits reaped under the current LIHTC program are un-
certain, but the case for LIHTC reform is strong. Part V will consider reform pro-
posals to promote integration by expanding low-income tenant housing choice. But 
first, the remainder of this Part will again ask whether a strong case against reform 
can be made—this time focusing on the mortgage interest deduction.  
B. Investing in High-Income Neighborhoods through the Mortgage Interest 
Deduction 
As described in Part I, unlike the LIHTC, which disproportionately flows to dis-
advantaged neighborhoods, mortgage interest deduction benefits flow almost en-
tirely into wealthy, disproportionately suburban neighborhoods. These are neighbor-
hoods with high proportions of homeownership, large houses, and high-income 
residents.165 Given what we know about the demographic that claims the mortgage 
interest deduction—and where those taxpayers live—the mortgage interest deduc-
tion can be conceptualized as a targeted investment in wealthy neighborhoods, which 
are often located in suburbs, through subsidized homeownership.  
The idea of targeting a housing subsidy to wealthy neighborhoods would strike 
many people as indefensible, particularly in light of the severe housing burdens ex-
perienced by many lower- and middle-income Americans.166 Tax professor Edward 
Zelinsky has explained that there may be at least one defense for the practice: to 
                                                                                                                
163. Lance Freeman & Hilary Botein, Subsidized Housing and Neighborhood Impacts: A 
Theoretical Discussion and Review of the Evidence, 16 J. PLAN. LITERATURE 359, 375 (2002) 
(noting that the “evaluation of the impacts of siting subsidized housing on neighborhoods does 
not consider fully the impacts on perhaps the most important constituency—residents of sub-
sidized housing”).
164. See, e.g., Cassidy et al., supra note 5, at 78–79; Kirk McClure, Deconcentrating 
Poverty with Housing Programs, 74 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 90, 90–99 (2008); Sean F. Reardon 
& Kendra Bischoff, Income Inequality and Income Segregation, 116 AM. J. SOC. 1092, 1093 
(2011). 
165. See Phyllis C. Taite, Taxes, the Problem and Solution: A Model for Vanishing 
Deductions and Exclusions for Residence-Based Tax, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 361 (2014). 
166. CONG. BUDGET OFF., FEDERAL HOUSING ASSISTANCE FOR LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS
10 (2015), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/50782-
lowincomehousing-onecolumn.pdf [https://perma.cc/LNN7-NFYQ] (reporting that roughly 
20 million American households are eligible for housing assistance, but nearly 75% of those 
households do not currently receive it. That number does not include the homeless population). 
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promote economic efficiency.167 Place-based investment in wealthy neighborhoods 
may be justified on efficiency grounds if homeownership produces positive external-
ities, those externalities rise in value as income levels rise, and a subsidy is required 
to achieve the optimal amount of housing consumption in those higher-income ar-
eas.168 This Part will consider the evidence in support of these three assumptions. 
1. Positive Externalities from Homeownership Decline at High Income Levels 
In theory, homeownership may produce positive externalities by encouraging 
neighborhood residents to maintain the quality and appearance of their homes, by 
positively influencing the neighborhood youth, or by encouraging citizen engage-
ment.169 All three theories have been debated in the literature and empirically 
tested.170 While there is evidence that homeownership produces at least some posi-
tive externalities, the results have been mixed, and it has been difficult to distinguish 
between correlation and causation when assessing the neighborhood effects of home-
ownership.171  
However, one recent study concluded that “an increase in neighborhood home-
ownership rate does cause an increase in neighborhood housing prices,” indicating 
that homeownership may create at least some positive externalities.172 Applying their 
findings to a hypothetical eleven-house neighborhood and a typical $90,000 prop-
erty, the authors estimated that every home purchased as a result of a housing subsidy 
                                                                                                                
167. Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax 
Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973, 1025 (1986). 
168. One may alternatively justify support of homeownership on the basis of private ben-
efit to homeowners, but economists disfavor public intervention in the absence of externalities 
or other market inefficiencies. See N. Edward Coulson & Herman Li, Measuring the External 
Benefits of Homeownership, 77 J. URB. ECON. 57, 57 (2013) (“The justification for the tax 
treatment of housing, or any subsidization of ownership should not rest on its status as a merit 
good—that ownership is part of the ‘American Dream’ and thus ‘should’ be accessible to any 
household—but with the more compelling justification that ownership creates external bene-
fits; that ownership not only creates private benefits, but also benefits for the neighborhood 
and broader community.”).
169. Donald R. Haurin, Robert D. Dietz & Bruce A. Weinberg, The Impact of 
Neighborhood Homeownership Rates: A Review of The Theoretical and Empirical Literature 
1 (March 6, 2002) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=452000 
[https://perma.cc/6WFP-YNQR]. Over the past two decades, numerous social scientists and 
economists have studied the “neighborhood effects” of homeownership. Id. at 21; see also 
Coulson & Li, supra note 168, at 57–58. A neighborhood effect is, roughly speaking, an ex-
ternality that “occurs when an individual’s or household’s characteristics or actions affect their 
neighbors’ behaviors or socioeconomic outcomes.” Haurin et al., supra, at 4. 
170. Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, The Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest 
Deduction (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9284, 2002), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9284 [https://perma.cc/D47Q-8BUU].
171. Coulson & Li, supra note 168; Haurin et al., supra note 169; see also Glaeser & 
Shapiro, supra note 170 (reviewing the literature and concluding that the “evidence is weak 
but suggestive” of the presence of homeownership externalities).
172. Coulson & Li, supra note 168, at 65. 
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would yield an annuity of approximately $1327 per year in positive externalities.173
In such a case, the mortgage interest deduction may be justified on the basis of pos-
itive neighborhood effects—but only if those positive externalities outweigh the size-
able deadweight loss observed in connection with the subsidy.174  
Here, the authors cited earlier estimates about the amount of deadweight loss 
caused by overconsumption of housing at different income levels.175 They concluded 
that the hypothetical example suggests “the benefits from that marginal owner out-
weigh the deadweight loss of the deduction for all but the highest income house-
holds.”176 As such, the study provides evidence in support of the assumption that 
                                                                                                                
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.; James M. Poterba, Taxation and Housing: Old Questions, New Answers, 82 AM.
ECON. REV. 237 (1992). For a summary of the evidence and arguments related to the proposi-
tion that the mortgage interest deduction incentivizes overconsumption of housing, see Glaeser 
& Shapiro, supra note 170. Poterba concluded that the annual deadweight loss due to over-
consumption of housing incentivized by the mortgage interest deduction was valued (in 1990 
dollars) as follows: $53 per taxpayer with $30,000 of annual income; $326 per taxpayer with 
$50,000 of annual income; and $1631 per taxpayers with $250,000 of annual income. See
Poterba, supra. 
176. Coulson & Li, supra note 168, at 65. Even if the hypothetical was representative and 
Poterba’s deadweight loss estimates were correct, it would be hard to say with certainty that 
the conclusion—that the benefits of the subsidy would outweigh its costs for all but the highest 
income households—actually follows from this data. Poterba’s income bands leave a wide gap 
between the $50,000 earner and the $250,000 earner (about $90,500 to $452,800 in 2014 dol-
lars), and unfortunately almost half of taxpayers claiming the mortgage interest deduction fall 
within that band. CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov 
/data/inflation_calculator.htm [https://perma.cc/PJS6-AF4Z]. In 2014, approximately 47.3% 
of mortgage interest deductions were claimed by taxpayers with $100,000 or more income. In 
other words, the analysis suggests that at some unknown point between $50,000 and $250,000 
in 1990 income, the deadweight loss must outweigh the benefits of the subsidy, but almost 
half of deduction-claiming taxpayers have incomes in or above that range. Joel Slemrod, 
Shlomo Yitzhaki, and David Schizer have argued that a subsidy should discontinue once the 
marginal cost of funds (deadweight loss at the margin) exceeds the marginal benefits from the 
subsidy. Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Integrating Expenditure and Tax Decisions: The 
Marginal Cost of Funds and the Marginal Benefit of Projects, 54 NAT’L. TAX J. 189 (2001); 
David M. Schizer, Limiting Tax Expenditures, 68 TAX L. REV. 275, 289 (2014). As such, the 
conclusion that the subsidy’s benefits likely outweigh the deadweight loss for all but the 
highest income earners may overstate the success of the subsidy because the highest income 
earners constitute a significant part of the mortgage interest deduction-claiming population. 
Furthermore, Coulson and Li’s analysis failed to take into account the offsetting effect of 
negative externalities produced by the mortgage interest deduction. Tax professor Roberta 
Mann and economist Edward Glaeser have both argued that significant environmental and 
social costs are associated with the homeownership in the suburbs that receive a significant 
portion of the mortgage interest deduction benefits. Edward L. Glaeser, Rethinking the Federal 
Bias Toward Homeownership, 13 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RES. 5 (2011); Mann, supra
note 15, at 1373–78. Mann has argued that the urban sprawl encouraged by the mortgage in-
terest deduction is associated with habitat loss, loss of farmland, and increased pollution. 
Mann, supra note 15, at 1373–75. In addition, she argues that “[s]prawl drains urban commu-
nities of funds and life” when upper- and middle-class families leave city centers for suburbia, 
resulting in racial and ethnic segregation. Id. at 1376–78. Glaeser has cited similar negative 
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homeownership produces externalities, but it also implies that the net value of those 
externalities varies by home value and tapers off at high income levels. Since the 
mortgage interest deduction is disproportionately claimed by taxpayers with high in-
comes, these studies cast doubt about its efficacy.  
2. Negative Externalities Outweigh Positive Externalities Associated with Home 
Consumption 
There is also some evidence that positive externalities from increased consump-
tion—as opposed to an initial homeownership decision—might rise with income 
level, thereby supporting the second assumption.177 The authors conceded that “[i]n 
principle, these estimates could justify exactly the subsidy we see in practice: a gen-
erous housing subsidy oriented toward the top of the income distribution.”178 The 
distinction between the initial homeownership decision and the level of consumption 
is important.179 There is little evidence that the mortgage interest deduction influ-
ences initial decisions about whether to buy a home; however, there is evidence that 
the mortgage interest deduction may induce homebuyers to purchase homes that are 
bigger or more expensive than they would otherwise purchase.180 If a subsidy is 
needed to increase home consumption, and if the positive externalities from in-
creased home consumption increase with income level, then there may be a case for 
maintaining the mortgage interest deduction in its current form.181  
Nevertheless, the authors expressed strong reservations about this conclusion, cit-
ing methodological limitations, and they highlighted several possible negative effects 
that may result from targeting the mortgage interest deduction to high-income com-
munities.182 As was the case in the LIHTC context, there are reasons to reject the 
                                                                                                                
externalities and attributed many of these costs to single-family dwellings, wherever located, 
but he did note that traffic-related costs are higher when housing is located in the suburbs. 
Glaeser, supra, at 22. These negative externalities function to offset positive externalities gen-
erated by homeownership and further reduce the value of the subsidy. 
177. Glaeser & Shapiro, supra note 170, at 16 (“If the evidence suggests large externalities 
[from housing consumption], particularly among the rich, then there may be a case for subsi-
dizing the housing consumption of this group through the home mortgage interest deduc-
tion.”).
178. Id. at 18. 
179. Id. The question of optimal level of consumption is distinct from the question of 
whether homeownership (as compared to nonhomeownership) produces externalities. Id. As 
such, for the purpose of the present inquiry, it is irrelevant that there is little evidence that the 
mortgage interest deduction induces homeownership at any income level, let alone at high 
income levels. See Mann, supra note 15, at 1385 (reviewing international data about home-
ownership in countries with and without subsidies comparable to the mortgage interest deduc-
tion and concluded that the data suggests that the deduction “does not necessarily impact 
homeownership rates”); Glaeser & Shapiro, supra note 170, at 41 (reviewing the literature and 
data on cross-state comparisons to understand how mortgage interest subsidies differ by state 
and concluded that the “impact on the homeownership rate appears to be minimal”); Morrow, 
supra note 102, at 762. 
180. See generally Albouy & Hanson, supra note 91. 
181. Glaeser & Shapiro, supra note 170, at 16. 
182. Id. at 18 (“Still, we believe that these results are sufficiently riddled with omitted 
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current spatial distribution of benefits despite the limited evidence in support of the 
status quo. First, large homes and suburban homes are associated with a range of 
negative externalities, from high energy usage in homes, to pollution and other eco-
nomic losses caused by increased commuter traffic.183 These negative externalities 
at least partially offset the modest positive externalities observed by the studies dis-
cussed.  
Second, the deduction may encourage disproportionate spending on housing for 
the wealthy, displacing spending on the poor. This objection is more than a statement 
about distributive justice in a world of limited resources; it is also an economic ar-
gument based on the theory of declining marginal utility.184 Every dollar invested in 
a high-income neighborhood to increase welfare in a wealthy community is a dollar 
not invested in a low-income neighborhood where that same dollar could have 
greater impact.  
Finally, the deduction may lead to social problems, including “incentives for the 
rich to live in fancier neighborhoods, which invariably means that the rich will tend 
to segregate more.”185 While the benefits of the mortgage interest deduction are un-
certain, the dangers of segregation are real—and this Article has shown that the po-
tential for the mortgage interest deduction to reinforce and reward segregation is 
compounded by the effects of the LIHTC, and vice versa. For this reason, Part V will 
advocate for comprehensive reform of both programs.  
V. REFORMING TAX-BASED HOUSING SUBSIDIES
A. New Reasons To Reform Tax-Based Housing Subsidies 
A growing body of literature asks how tax systems contribute to widening eco-
nomic and social inequalities in America. There are several ways this basic question 
can be asked, but much of the literature on economic inequality reflects two distinct 
concerns: concentrations of wealth at the high end of the income scale that help em-
power a small and disproportionately rich minority of Americans;186 or the scarcity 
                                                                                                                
variables problems that we would be loath to accept them without more proof.”). But see 
Zelinsky, supra note 167, at 1025–26 (stressing the need to remain open to the possibility that 
economic arguments may favor an upside-down subsidy like the mortgage interest deduction). 
Zelinsky has argued that if, in theory, blue-collar neighborhoods inhabited by middle-income 
homeowners are less susceptible to enhancement through the tax system than the property 
values where high-income taxpayers live, then “it may be desirable to encourage the person 
living in a half-million dollar home to acquire a second mortgage, improve his property and 
thereby generate externalities.” Id. at 1025. 
183. Mann, supra note 15, at 1370–71.
184. See Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation,
19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1952). Stated differently, a dollar spent in a wealthy neighborhood to 
achieve modest increases in the value of homes that were already highly valued probably will 
produce smaller welfare gains than a dollar spent on services for the poor; a dollar simply has 
more utility to the poor than it does to the rich. 
185. Glaeser & Shapiro, supra note 170, at 21; see supra Part III. 
186. See, e.g., Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Unseating Privilege: Rawls, Equality of Opportunity, 
and Wealth Transfer Taxation, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 713 (2013); Alice Gresham Bullock, Tax 
Code, the Tax Gap, and Income Inequality: The Middle Class Squeeze, 53 HOW. L.J. 249
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of resources at the low end of the income scale that leaves many Americans in pov-
erty.187 Within this traditional construct, the mortgage interest deduction has been 
thoroughly critiqued along the first line of inquiry as an upside-down subsidy that 
promotes the concentration of wealth by diluting progressivity in the tax system.188
And the LIHTC has been critiqued along the second line of inquiry as an antipoverty 
program to help correct economic inequality from the bottom.189
This Article has identified a new space where these two lines of inquiry intersect 
to exacerbate social and economic inequalities. When the mortgage interest deduc-
tion and LIHTC are viewed in combination, important new insights can be made. 
First, Part III demonstrated that the inequities associated with tax-based housing sub-
sidies are even worse than we had realized: the mortgage interest deduction and the 
LIHTC have potential to reinforce and reward economic and social segregation. 
Second, Part IV explained that social and economic costs outweigh the uncertain 
benefits associated with the current spatial distribution of the mortgage interest de-
duction. Having established a case for reform, this Part will briefly consider several 
proposals and the challenges they present. 
B. Reform the LIHTC Program Through Qualified Allocation Plan Amendments 
Ideally, both the LIHTC and mortgage interest deduction laws should be reformed 
not only to remove the barriers they pose to integration but also to affirmatively pro-
mote integration. In the current political environment, this goal would be most easily 
achieved on the LIHTC side. Some have suggested scaling back federal qualified 
census tract and difficult development area incentives by making the basis boost 
                                                                                                                
(2010); Peter Diamond & Emmanuel Saez, The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic 
Research to Policy Recommendations, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 165 (2011); David Gamage, How 
Should Governments Promote Distributive Justice?: A Framework for Analyzing the Optimal 
Choice of Tax Instruments, 68 TAX L. REV. 1 (2014); Liam Murphy, Why Does Inequality 
Matter?: Reflections on the Political Morality of Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century,
68 TAX L. REV. 613 (2015); Phyllis C. Taite, Exploding Wealth Inequalities: Does Tax Policy 
Promote Social Justice or Social Injustice?, 36 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 201 (2014). 
187. See, e.g., David Kamin, Reducing Poverty, Not Inequality: What Changes in the Tax 
System Can Achieve, 66 TAX L. REV. 593 (2013); Susannah Camic Tahk, The Tax War on 
Poverty, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 791 (2014); Eric M. Zolt, Inequality in America: Challenges for Tax 
and Spending Policies, 66 TAX L. REV. 641 (2013). 
188. See Phyllis C. Taite, Taxes, the Problem and Solution: A Model for Vanishing 
Deductions and Exclusions for Residence-Based Tax Preferences, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 361 
(2014) (urging policymakers to adopt policies that reverse regressive tax preferences including 
housing-related tax preferences like the MID, capital gains exclusion and property tax 
deduction). Taite emphasized that current policies “contribute to the wealth and income ine-
quality that disadvantage the poor and middle class in favor of the wealthy.” Taite, supra note 
186, at 202. Among the reforms were a one-time refundable home buying credit and a scaled-
back MID available only to certain middle-income persons. See Bullock, supra note 186
(pointing to regressive tax subsidies like the housing tax subsidies as examples of tax policies 
that help to maintain the imbalance of political power that disadvantages low and middle-
income persons). 
189. E.g., Tahk, supra note 187. 
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available solely to projects that are most in need of the extra subsidy.190 By scaling 
back the basis boost, proponents hope that fewer projects would be sited in these very 
low-income areas.191 However, it is hard to predict whether merely scaling back the 
basis boosts would meaningfully change the spatial distribution of LIHTC properties. 
A more promising approach is to reform the law through state-level administrative 
changes that give low-income tenants more opportunities to live in integrated areas. 
Both proposals are explored more fully below. 
1. Uncertain Effect of Scaling Back the Basis Boost Provisions 
As was explained in Part IV, there is some indication that a nontrivial number of 
projects built in high-poverty areas would be built even without the LIHTC, espe-
cially if developers anticipate future gentrification of the area192—and if those pro-
jects would be built in such areas without any credit at all, it seems reasonable to 
expect them to be built in those same areas without any basis boosts. In other words, 
it is hard to gauge how much of the current distribution of LIHTC properties can be 
attributed to the qualified census tract and difficult development area basis boost 
provisions as opposed to developers’ independent cost-benefit analysis. And though 
it seems likely that removing the extra incentive to develop projects in low-income 
areas would help some, further changes would probably be needed to affirmatively 
incentivize development of projects that promote residential integration.  
2. Promoting Integration Through Qualified Allocation Plans 
One of the most promising ways to affirmatively incentivize projects that promote 
residential integration is to follow models that have already begun to emerge under 
state law as states amend their qualified allocation plans to promote a wider range of 
affordable housing options for low-income tenants. During the recent financial crisis, 
Congress adopted the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, which author-
ized states to extend the difficult development area basis boost to a greater variety of 
projects.193 Several states have incorporated specific locational criteria in their eligi-
bility requirements for the basis boost authorized by the Act.194  
                                                                                                                
190. See, e.g., Baum-Snow & Marion, supra note 118. 
191. Id.
192. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
193. Pub. L. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 § 3003. The Act provided that state housing agencies 
could designate “any building” as requiring the larger subsidy, and such building would be 
treated “as located in a difficult development area” if necessary to make a project “financially 
feasible.” I.R.C. § 42(d)(5)(B)(v) (West 2011 & Supp. 2017). The district court in Inclusive 
Communities noted that “[b]efore the enactment of [the Housing and Economic Recovery Act 
of 2008 HERA)], states were limited to awarding 30% basis boosts only to developments lo-
cated in qualified census tracts or difficult development areas. But after HERA, states were 
permitted to choose the developments to receive the boost.” Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. 
Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 860 F. Supp. 2d 312, 324 (N.D. Tex. 2012).
194. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 112, at 4 (“[M]any states used loca-
tional criteria in determining eligibility for the [Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008] 
basis boost.”).
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As a result, developers in those states now have incentives to propose projects 
tailored toward those new eligibility requirements in addition to the traditional qual-
ified census tract and difficult development area eligibility requirements.195 In addi-
tion, several states have amended their prioritization criteria to give greater weight 
to higher quality areas. Early research on the effects of these changes suggests that 
they are effective at changing the spatial distribution of LIHTC properties.196 These 
examples not only lend support to the hypothesis that states’ prioritization rules and 
the qualified census tract and difficult development area basis boost provisions have 
influenced the distribution in the past but also suggests a path forward that can in-
crease housing options for low-income tenants. 
For example, Texas was among the states that used locational criteria to determine 
eligibility for the basis boost authorized under the Housing and Economic Recovery 
Act of 2008. The state amended its qualified allocation plan to define “high oppor-
tunity areas” eligible for the increased subsidy as areas with good public transporta-
tion, quality schools, higher income, and low poverty.197 During the litigation of 
Inclusive Communities, the Texas housing authority told the court that the change 
was “likely to have a positive effect in increasing the number of LIHTC 
developments in [high opportunity areas].”198 The state’s prediction was later 
confirmed by HUD research findings that Texas “saw increases in the share of units 
built in low poverty neighborhoods.”199
Meanwhile, New Jersey was among the states that amended their prioritization 
criteria. The state amended its prioritization criteria to emphasize higher-opportunity 
neighborhoods and dedicated roughly 60% of the state’s available credits to such 
projects.200 At the time of the lawsuit, only 12% of New Jersey’s LIHTC properties 
were placed in low-poverty areas.201 By 2013, 47% of LIHTC allocations were to 
projects in low-poverty neighborhoods, a rise that has been attributed to the 
changes.202 An alternative approach adopted by several states in their qualified allo-
cation plans has been to increase prioritization of projects associated with certain 
amenities, such as quality transit or distance from environmental hazards.203
The trend among state housing authorities toward creating incentives for afforda-
ble housing development in lower-poverty, higher-opportunity areas reflects a shift 
away from the uncertain, place-based investment approach to LIHTC policy de-
scribed in Part IV toward an approach that emphasizes housing choice. As more 
                                                                                                                
195. For more on states’ responses to the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, 
see Part III.B. 
196. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 112. 
197. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 325. 
198. Id. (alteration in original). 
199. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 112, at 14. 
200. Id. Similarly, Massachusetts now allocates extra prioritization points to projects de-
veloped in an “opportunity area.” Id. at 7. Mississippi has shifted from a model that “provided 
the most points for development in the most impoverished counties” to a model that provides 
the most points to “developments in counties that [have] the highest per capita incomes.” Id.
at 8. 
201. Id. at 23. 
202. Id.
203. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 112, at 8. 
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LIHTC properties are built in lower poverty areas, low-income tenants (including 
those who participate in tenant voucher programs) will have greater flexibility to 
choose the type of neighborhood that suits their preferences. These changes also have 
the potential to reduce the extent to which the LIHTC program contributes to racial 
and economic segregation in many cities.  
The early results of state-level qualified allocation plan amendments have been 
encouraging.204 Nevertheless, some caution is in order. Under current law, many 
LIHTC property tenants lack housing options and are therefore restricted in their 
residential mobility; however, if reformed policies result in the disproportionate sit-
ing of LIHTC properties in low-poverty areas, such policies may resemble forced-
resettlement programs. Most housing and urban planning experts reject policies that 
rely on forced resettlement.205 States should take care to design programs that max-
imize tenants’ locational choices, as there is at least some risk that the pendulum 
could swing too far in the other direction. 
Nevertheless, widespread adoption of similar qualified allocation plan provisions 
may help promote more integrated communities in metropolitan areas. Ideally, the 
federal tax law would be amended to more fully embrace the approach that has been 
tested at the state level, either to require states to take neighborhood quality into ac-
count as part of their selection criteria or to guarantee basis-boost eligibility for pro-
jects located in such areas.206 Practically speaking, however, it seems unlikely in the 
current political climate that Congress or the IRS will make these changes. For this 
reason, state lawmakers and housing authorities should take care to review state qual-
ified allocation plans and revise them as needed to affirmatively promote develop-
ment of affordable housing in low-poverty areas even in the absence of a federal 
mandate. Qualified allocation plan changes that are explicitly race-conscious may 
trigger strict scrutiny if challenged,207 but race-neutral policies that promote income 
integration should not. 
                                                                                                                
204. Id.
205. See, e.g., Cassidy et al., supra note 5, at 79.
206. As explained in Part III, nothing in federal law requires states to make such changes. 
The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 itself is location-neutral and would not be 
expected to produce mobility effects unless states specifically include locational criteria in the
eligibility requirements. And although the tax code requires states to include project location 
among its project selection criteria for prioritization, neither the statute nor regulations elabo-
rate on the requirement. I.R.C. § 42(m)(1)(C) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-140). The 
discretion left to states to administer the LIHTC reflects the assumption that state housing 
authorities know more about their states’ housing needs than either Congress or the IRS, and 
it permits greater flexibility for states to address states-specific challenges. Callison, supra
note 20, at 230–31 (describing the program in terms of cooperative federalism). Still, in this 
case the discretion presents challenges for a federal response to a problem that crosses state 
borders. 
207. The Supreme Court has held that remedying the effects of past segregation does not 
pass strict scrutiny in cases where past segregation was not mandated by law. See Parents 
Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (applying strict scru-
tiny to invalidate a school assignment plan that included racial criteria where the school district 
in question was never segregated by law or subject to court-ordered desegregation). In this 
case, the tax law does not mandate segregation but merely includes features that may encour-
age segregation. 
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C. Replace the Mortgage Interest Deduction with a Refundable Tax Credit 
Meanwhile, the potential for the mortgage interest deduction to reinforce segre-
gation must also be acknowledged and taken seriously if we are to remove all barriers 
to integration presented by these tax laws. The ideas set forth in Part III may strike 
some as fanciful. After all, one might expect the mortgage interest deduction to pro-
mote residential stability though homeownership, not to encourage White-flight 
through economic incentives. Once a person owns a home, he or she is less likely to 
move and more likely to maintain the property and participate in the local commu-
nity.  
However, there are at least two reasons why the stabilizing effect of homeowner-
ship is not necessarily inconsistent with the claims made in this Article. First, the 
impact on mobility discussed here refers to the expanded options homebuyers may 
have, thanks to the deduction, combined with specific incentives to choose some 
home locations over others. When choosing a neighborhood, homebuyers routinely 
weigh the cost of housing against a variety of factors that will contribute to their 
quality of life,208 and to the extent that the mortgage interest deduction alters that 
balance, it has the potential to influence decisions about location. This is especially 
true if homebuyers overestimate the value of the mortgage interest deduction, which 
they often do.209  
Second, to the extent that the mortgage interest deduction does successfully pro-
mote residential stability by encouraging people to choose a living arrangement that 
restricts further mobility, it may act to make those location decisions permanent.210
No one would reasonably expect the mortgage interest deduction to spur a mass mi-
gration from cities to suburbs, but if individual households with similar de-
mographics tend to move to the same neighborhoods and then stop moving, then the 
aggregate result over time may be more segregated communities. Reform is needed 
to prevent these results. This section will look at two categories of reform. The first 
would rely on a partial repeal of the deduction, and the second would fully repeal the 
deduction and replace it with a credit.  
1. Uncertain Impact of a Partial Repeal of the Mortgage Interest Deduction  
A mere repeal of the mortgage interest deduction (or a partial repeal, such as the 
recent scale-back through the TCJA211) probably would not be enough to remedy 
                                                                                                                
208. See EILLI THOMAS, ILONA SERWICKA & PAUL SWINNEY, CTR. FOR CITIES, URBAN 
DEMOGRAPHICS: WHY PEOPLE LIVE WHERE THEY DO (2015), http://www.centreforcities.org 
/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/15-11-02-Urban-Demographics.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LHJ-
88JP]. 
209. Kathleen Pender, Mortgage Interest Deduction Claims, Facts, SFGATE (Dec. 18, 
2012, 8:39 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/business/networth/article/Mortgage-interest-deduction-
claims-facts-4129555.php [https://perma.cc/M3SA-GDU6] (quoting Prof. Dennis Ventry).  
210. Callison, supra note 20, at 222 (noting that “[h]ousing patterns have a tendency to 
remain stable due to the fact that individual housing choices are made relatively infrequently” 
and, as a result, the effects of past government actions continue to be seen in present patterns 
of housing). 
211. See infra note 213. 
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past harm.212 To be sure, eliminating the mortgage interest deduction would have an 
immediate benefit of eliminating a subsidy that disproportionately benefits wealthy 
homeowners and would potentially free up to $84 billion a year of resource that could 
be redistributed for other purposes. It would also remove the barriers to integration 
and homeownership discussed in Part III.A. These changes would be a step in the 
right direction, but they would not affirmatively promote integrated communities.213
One of the more provocative proposals for affirmatively promoting integration 
through mortgage interest deduction reform would limit access to the mortgage in-
terest deduction to integrated neighborhoods. Tax professor Dorothy Brown has 
asked: “Why don’t we say no one gets a mortgage interest deduction unless they live 
in an integrated neighborhood? . . . We realize you’re taking a penalty in the market, 
and we want to compensate you by lowering your taxes.”214 Similarly, law professor 
John Charles Boger has suggested that the mortgage interest deduction be progres-
sively withdrawn from municipalities that fail to assume their “‘fair share’ of racially 
and economically integrated housing.”215 Reforms like these would seize on the mo-
bility effects of the deduction by making the value entirely contingent on moving to 
                                                                                                                
212. Many tax academics and economists have called for the mortgage interest deduction 
to be repealed and replaced. See, e.g., Mann, supra note 15, at 1393; Morrow, supra note 102,
at 799; Ventry, supra note 12, at 282–83.  
213. The TCJA significantly scaled back the mortgage interest deduction in two ways. 
First, under prior law, interest on residential mortgages (and home equity loans) up to 
$1,000,000 were deductible. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(E) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-140). 
Now, interest may only be deducted on mortgages up to $750,000, and interest on home equity 
loans is no longer deductible. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(F)(i). Second, under prior law the standard 
deduction was $6350 for individuals and $12,700 for taxpayers who were married filing 
jointly. Rev. Proc. 2016-55, 2016-45 I.R.B. 707. The TCJA nearly doubled the standard de-
duction amounts, raising them to $12,000 for individuals and $18,000 for married couples. 
See I.R.C. § 63(c)(7). Taxpayers only itemize their tax returns if the sum of their itemized 
deductions exceeds the standard deductions, so the number of taxpayers who will itemize is 
expected to decrease under the new tax law. See Sara O’Brien, Tax Bill Will Slash by Half the 
Number of Homeowners Using the Mortgage Interest Deduction, CNBC.com (April 23, 2018) 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/23/tax-bill-will-slash-the-number-of-homeowners-claiming-
the-mortgage-deduction.html [https://perma.cc/KZ55-EBR9] (reporting that the number of 
itemizers is expected to drop from 46.5 million to 18 million). Since the mortgage interest 
deduction is an itemized deduction, this change will significantly reduce the number of people 
who claim it. See id. (reporting that a 57% drop in mortgage interest deduction claimants is 
expected). Together, these changes dramatically scale back the mortgage interest deduction, a 
change that is certainly a step in the right direction given the problems raised in this Article. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that the mortgage interest deduction is still available, it should be 
noted that the changes skew the law in favor of the wealthy, who are in the best position to 
surpass the standard deduction threshold. Therefore, the observations made in this Article con-
tinue to be true under the new law, albeit with respect to a smaller number of taxpayers. 
Moreover, the partial repeal may remove a barrier to integration, but it does nothing to affirm-
atively promote it. 
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Bias, WASH. POST. (June 21, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016 
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locations that are consistent with integration goals. Complications could arise if the 
deduction accelerates gentrification, but it may be possible to mitigate some of the 
more harmful effects of gentrification by compensating those who are affected by 
rising rental rates or property taxes, for example. 
Nevertheless, any partial repeal of the mortgage interest deduction may raise 
home prices in the newly targeted neighborhoods that cannot adequately absorb the 
increased demand. Conversely, it may lower the home prices in neighborhoods that 
are no longer targeted. If specific neighborhoods are designated as qualifying for the 
deduction, then those neighborhoods would be most likely to experience home price 
increases due to capitalization.216 A partial repeal would probably change the spatial 
distribution of the mortgage interest, but many of the newly targeted neighborhoods 
would then be vulnerable to price increases due to capitalization.217 This could not 
only reduce the effectiveness of the incentive, but it could create a situation in which 
homebuyers actively avoid the very purchases the tax law intended to incentivize.  
2. Benefits of Refundable Housing Tax Credits 
Given the potential downside to a partial repeal, I believe a better reform option 
would be to replace the deduction with a form of tax preference commonly used to 
deliver tax-based benefits to low-income taxpayers: the refundable tax credit.218
Refundable tax credits offer a relatively straightforward answer to the problems cre-
ated by unequal access to the mortgage interest deduction.219 Because refundable tax 
credits offset a taxpayer’s tax liability on a dollar-for-dollar basis and are not limited 
by a taxpayer’s income, taxpayers at all income levels could be given access to a 
refundable tax credit—or its availability could be limited entirely to lower- and mid-
dle-income homebuyers. 
For example, if a taxpayer earned a 25% credit on $4000 of mortgage interest 
paid, then that taxpayer would earn a $1000 credit. If the taxpayer had $1500 in tax 
liability, then he or she would owe only $500 after applying the credit. If the taxpayer 
instead had only $100 in tax liability, then the taxpayer would owe no taxes and 
would be entitled to a $900 tax refund from the IRS. The credit would be available 
regardless of whether the taxpayer filed an itemized tax return. This change would 
make the tax preference widely available to all potential homebuyers, including 
lower- and middle-income homebuyers that are unable to access the mortgage inter-
est deduction under current law.  
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Finally, if the goal is to promote residential integration through tax-based housing 
policy, then it may be necessary to look beyond homeownership incentives in order 
to reach the population of renters. The LIHTC subsidizes rental housing, but the sub-
sidy is only available to very low-income tenants. Both major tax-based subsides 
miss a large segment of the population comprised by middle-income renters. If resi-
dential patterns are to be redrawn, then policies must address this group. Several 
states have experimented with tax preferences for renters. For example, California 
provides a tax credit for certain renters with low incomes,220 and Indiana allows all 
renters (except those who are exempt from Indiana property tax) to deduct up to 
$3000 of rental payments.221 Tax benefits like these help to achieve parity with 
homeowners who benefit from the mortgage interest deduction. Their effect on mo-
bility would probably be similar to that of the current mortgage interest deduction, 
however, unless the availability of the tax preference were limited to certain qualified 
neighborhoods. Again, a refundable credit may be preferable over deductions since 
it would minimize the adverse effects of capitalization. 
The steepest hurdle to enacting the mortgage interest deduction reforms recom-
mended here are political. Although Congress recently scaled back the mortgage in-
terest deduction under the TCJA,222 proposals to eliminate it entirely continue to be 
deeply unpopular. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the TCJA indirectly repealed
the mortgage interest deduction for more than half of taxpayers who previously 
claimed it by further limiting the availability of itemized deduction.223 In other 
words, rather than expanding access to benefits for lower- and middle-income home-
buyers, the mortgage interest deduction was effectively repealed for that group but 
remains available to higher-income homeowners. On the one hand, making the mort-
gage interest deduction less available to taxpayers may help mitigate some of the 
problems discussed in this Article by making the rewards for segregation less avail-
able. It should be noted, though, that the partial repeal could expand the number of 
lower- and middle-income taxpayers who are harmed by the effects of capitalization.  
D. Issues Raised by Reform Proposals 
That said, a few caveats should be made even with respect to these proposals made 
in this Article. The first is that human biases and uncertainty about the size of the tax 
benefit undoubtedly complicate the extent to which the mortgage interest deduction 
or any reform proposal set forth here may influence actual behavior.224 The evidence 
that the mortgage interest deduction influences home purchase decisions, for exam-
ple, is mixed. Many experts have expressed doubt that the deduction has any impact 
at all on the initial purchase decision.225 On the other hand, most experts have con-
cluded that at least some capitalization of the deduction occurs, which suggests that 
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the deduction succeeds in increasing demand enough to produce capitalization of the 
subsidy.226  
Determining with certainty the extent to which location decisions are affected by 
the mortgage interest deduction or the LIHTC would be a difficult task, and empirical 
research would be needed to test the theory. Nevertheless, the spatial patterns of the 
tax benefits do not suggest that either the mortgage interest deduction or LIHTC, in 
their current form, encourage integration.227 Meanwhile, this Article has set forth 
several reasons to believe that the tax policies could theoretically create incentives 
for segregation. As such, the uncertainty about the degree of influence these pro-
grams have should not be a reason to hesitate to make changes to the law that more 
effectively promote economic and social integration. 
Second, one should not overstate the role of the tax law in the residential patterns 
that can be observed in America’s cities. Nontax law and policies, social preferences, 
and history have all contributed—in most cases to a much greater degree than any 
tax law—to the segregation of neighborhoods and conditions in urban (and suburban) 
areas.228 Among the most problematic of these are land-use regulations. Pre-Civil 
Rights Era city planning often included racial zoning laws that segregated White and 
Black populations.229 Today, some cities continue to use exclusionary zoning laws 
“designed to price certain demographics out of particular neighborhoods or jurisdic-
tions, making these locations inaccessible to low-or middle-income individuals.”230
Even the most benign land-use regulations may increase housing costs in a manner 
that disproportionately burdens low-income households.231  
Reforming the tax law may help minimize the extent to which tax-based subsidies 
exacerbate problems caused by land-use regulations. A repeal or partial repeal of the 
mortgage interest deduction, for example, would most likely lower home prices in 
many areas where supply is suppressed by land-use regulations.232 This is because 
capitalization is most likely to occur when demand outpaces supply, as one would 
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expect to see in an area where land-use prevents new residential construction or tall 
buildings.233 Nevertheless, reforming the tax law cannot solve all problems associ-
ated with land-use restrictions, and in some cases land-use restrictions may even pre-
sent challenges to tax reform. For example, if many low-poverty neighborhoods pro-
hibit large rental properties, then even the strongest tax incentives to site LIHTC 
properties in such areas will be unsuccessful. In such cases, further reform of land-
use regulations may also be necessary. 
Another nontax area ripe for reform is tenant voucher programs. The LIHTC pro-
gram has a tendency to limit the effectiveness of tenant voucher programs because 
most non-LIHTC property landlords are free to reject tenant vouchers. Given this 
authority, they often do reject tenant vouchers—to the detriment of the program. 
Many states have adopted laws that require landlords to accept tenant vouchers. So 
far, results have been mixed.234 The laws are generally regarded by landlords as a 
violation of their rights. In addition, even when landlords are required to accept ten-
ant vouchers, they remain free to reject an applicant for other reasons that could eas-
ily become a pretext to avoid leasing to a low-income tenant.235  
Finally, it is worth noting that although no court has yet held that a state housing 
authority must work to promote integrated communities through LIHTC policy, the 
persistence of segregation patterns a half century after the Civil Rights Act suggests 
that merely eliminating legal barriers to integration is insufficient to produce mean-
ingful change.236 But meaningful change must occur if we hope to reverse the trend 
toward growing economic inequality in America.237 For this reason, this Article has 
advocated for reforms that would not only remove barriers to integration that may 
exist in current tax law but would instead actively promote it. Nevertheless, even a 
more conservative approach limited to eliminating barriers to inequality would be a 
step in the right direction.  
CONCLUSION
While the benefits of integration can certainly be debated, almost no one argues 
that segregation helps low-income or minority populations. Nevertheless, de facto 
economic and racial segregation persists in many urban areas, and those segregated 
housing patterns are visible in the spatial distribution of tax-based housing subsidies. 
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This Article began the analysis of the relationship between tax-based housing subsi-
dies and place of residence by considering the impact of the mortgage interest de-
duction and LIHTC properties on the neighborhoods where they flow. Although this 
Article focused primarily on urban locations, future research in this area may con-
sider the impact of tax-based housing subsidies on rural regions, which often experi-
ence different spatial distributions of benefits than what is observed in cities. 
The inadequacies of mortgage interest deduction and LIHTC programs go beyond 
the mere failure of these tax laws to target subsidies to the right locations given cur-
rent residential patterns. Both programs may affect people’s decisions about where 
to live, and the potential mobility effects of the mortgage interest deduction and the 
LIHTC push in opposite directions. As a result, the spatial distribution of tax-based 
housing subsidies may not merely reflect residential segregation patterns—they have 
the capacity to reinforce and reward them. Given the extent of the potential harm and 
its tendency to endure, this Article has argued in favor of affirmative efforts to in-
centivize economic and racial integration and change the spatial distributions of tax-
based housing subsidies.  
A full response to the problem of segregation will almost certainly require addi-
tional nontax reforms, and it is possible that housing policy will someday be returned 
entirely to nontax authorities, eliminating the need for tax-based solutions altogether. 
In the meantime, the significant role the tax law plays in housing policy leaves no 
option to ignore the impact of tax-based housing subsidies on place of residence. One 
can imagine a map in which all mortgage interest deduction benefits flow to inte-
grated or integrating neighborhoods and LIHTC properties are found in more middle- 
and upper-income neighborhoods. That map would look quite different from the ones 
presented in Part I of this Article. Whether the spatial distribution reflects existing 
segregation patterns or those reinforced by tax law, these maps are a visible reminder 
of the inequalities that remain in our tax system and in the nontax social policies it 
promotes. 
